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THESIS

**SPAIN, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED
STATES IN THE AGE OF TERROR: SPANISH
STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON
TERROR**

by

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June 2004

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**SPAIN, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE AGE OF
TERROR: SPANISH STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis looks beyond the tragic events of 11 March 2004 to uncover the greater Spanish strategic culture that motivates and influences Spain's political elites. By examining the interaction between Spanish conservatives and liberals, discerning the Spanish strategic culture will allow for a greater understanding of the foreign policy implications to both the Spanish-US relationship and Spanish-EU integration after the Madrid bombings.

By understanding how Spanish elites make decisions on the utilization of military force with respect to NATO operations and European Union security, this thesis first demonstrates the strategic preferences of the Spanish elites. Secondly, this thesis shows that the collective identity of Spanish elites seeks further influence in regional and global policymaking. Lastly, this thesis reveals that Spain is in a unique position to develop a strong bilateral relationship with the US while furthering its integration with the EU but is unwilling to support the furthering of integration at expense of Spanish national interests.

Uncovering the Spanish strategic culture will provide a possible generalization to whether this event will lead to a shift in the Spanish strategic culture or open a new chapter in the transatlantic relationship. This thesis suggests that the bombings will not redefine the strategic culture of Spain but reinforce Spain's commitment against international terrorism. This commitment will help shape the EU's cooperation and direction on dealing with international terrorism.

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I. INTRODUCTION TO SPANISH STRATEGIC CULTURE

A. INTRODUCTION

Spain's commitment to the global war on terror is in question in the aftermath of the March 11, 2004 bombings in Madrid. While the political and military effects of the bombings are still becoming apparent with the decision to withdraw its forces from Iraq, the terrorist acts placed a significant strain on Spain's democratic governance. Indeed, one US interpretation critical of the bombings described the Spanish decision to change its government on March 14, 2004 as a "cowardly" act and stated that the Spanish people caved to the terrorist by voting for a change in government.¹ Lost in this superficial analysis are the underlying principles of the Spanish political decision-making processes, which form a principle part of this analysis.

The general elections in Spain in March 2004 demonstrated two fundamentals of modern Spanish political reality. First, the Spanish people do not like the perception of governmental manipulation of information for political gain, and second, they do not like their politicians acting without consultation with public opinion. While the politicization of the tragedy of Madrid incited the population to vote, the outcome of the vote uncovered a deep wound in Spanish mentality: the Spanish people completely reject the perception of authoritarianism in their government.

A realistic interpretation of the effects of the bombings requires an in-depth analysis of the Spanish political system and Spanish elite's decision-making process. The *Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)* makes a clear distinction between the United States-led campaign in Iraq and the global war on terrorism. Spanish President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (*PSOE*) has determined that no United Nations resolution will come that will satisfy Spanish political demands to keep Spanish forces in Iraq. It is yet undetermined whether the Madrid bombings will mark a dramatic shift in the foreign relations of the Spanish government with respect to the US and European Union. A better understanding of how the bombings will affect the Spanish political elites and their

¹ Luttwak, E.N. 16 March 2004. "Rewarding Terror in Spain." New York Times.

political process, however, comes through an analysis of how Spanish elites make decisions in similar types of defense related crisis within the theme of strategic culture.

This thesis looks beyond the tragic events of 11 March 2004 to uncover the greater Spanish strategic culture that motivates and influences Spain's political elites. Spanish elites have definitive personalities and this character is better understood in the context of how Spanish elites have responded during similar emergencies since 1923. Additionally, this thesis explores the development of the Spanish strategic culture from 1923 to 2004 to gain an appreciation of the basic political motivations and ideologies of the Spanish elites. By examining the interaction between Spanish conservatives and liberals, discerning the Spanish strategic culture will allow for a greater understanding of the foreign policy implications to both the Spanish-US relationship and Spanish-EU integration after the Madrid bombings.

The ties between the US and Spain are strong. While the modern Spanish-US bilateral relationship is over 50 years old, the early strategic association dealt with the effects of an open confrontation with the Soviet Union that necessitated the US to maintain relations with the authoritarian Franco regime after 1949. In light of the Spanish transition to democracy in 1975, the US now has more history with a democratic Spain than with its authoritarian past. Moreover, the history of the US relationship with Spain's Socialist government also provides a key to understanding the negotiating styles of the *PSOE*.

Conversely, the Spanish relationship with the European Community and EU is a comparatively modern development, but the historical relationships with individual European nation-states and the EU common market provide insights to how the Spanish political elites see Spanish integration into EU structures. This thesis will further assess the strategic culture of Spain to determine whether Spain will support both the bilateral relationship with the US and Spanish integration into the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).² To analyze the Spanish strategic culture, this study treats the decision-making processes of Spanish

² The CFSP is the "second pillar" of the EU organization and "is designed to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union, preserve peace and strengthen international security, promote international cooperation, and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." See NATO Handbook. 2002. p. 357.

political-military elites to discover the implications of how their decisions affect Spanish-US affairs, NATO relations and EU integration.

Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the CFSP writes, “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention...A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.”³ The development of the EU’s CFSP provides an indication for the progression of the EU towards a treaty establishing a constitution for its members. Spain has a specific role in this process but Spain is in a position to maintain strong relationship with the US while continuing its support with North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as furthering EU integration. The European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” provides an indication of a possible direction that Spain will consider to further the progression of the CFSP.⁴ By analyzing Spanish strategic culture, this thesis intends to advance an understanding of how Spain fits into international security processes to include the global war on terror and the EU’s CFSP and thereby cast light into the darkness of the rhetoric towards the US-led campaign in Iraq in 2003.

B. STRATEGIC CULTURE FRAMEWORK

Strategic culture discussions serve as a tool to analyze the diverse nature of the Spanish political and military cultures that seek further integration into NATO and the EU while maintaining bilateral relations with the US. Ideological divergences between the elites of Spain continue to produce differing results on the process and direction of Spanish integration into NATO and the EU. This strategic culture analysis helps to determine whether ideological similarities emerge towards the use of force. As a starting point, this analysis defines strategic culture as

an integrated “system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in

³ See *A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy*. European Council – Brussels, 12 December 2003. p. 11. As the Secretary-General/EU High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana directed this paper to be written for the concurrence of the EU member states. The Counsel of the EU adopted the policy statement on 12 December 2003.

⁴ Ibid.

interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.”⁵

This strategic culture analysis will examine Spanish domestic considerations that affected their internal and external decision-making processes. By elucidating the reaction of Spanish elites in times of political and social crisis, strategic preferences will become apparent suggesting how strategic culture ultimately provided limits to Spanish decision-making processes.⁶ Cultural explanations also help to account for why Spanish elites react differently in similar situations or to similar questions. The variation of the reaction of the elites shows that the socialization of those elites to a particular ideology or theoretical foundation affects their decision-making processes. By analyzing how elites make critical decisions during a political-military crisis, this study shows how domestic considerations influence strategic culture.

This strategic culture study will investigate Spain’s recent political-military experiences during periods of relative crisis since 1975. By defining strategic culture in terms of how elites react to crises, the analysis demonstrates how radical changes in the domestic and international conditions, such as the terrorist act in March 2004, may lead to changes in political orientation. A problem exists, however, because strategic culture discussions often misrepresent concepts of ethnocentricity and culture by overstating a national character that influences decisions of the government.⁷

Within the realm of security, developing a collective identity may also play a role in the development of a strategic culture.⁸ Strategic culture examines the “historically based inertia” that influences decision-making by means other than power discussion.⁹ This theory does not completely reject a realist argument that strategic decisions are based on “optimizing power, constrained only, or largely, by variables such as

⁵ See Johnston, A. I. “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” *International Security*, Vol 19, No. 4 Spring 95, p. 46. Johnston paraphrases Geertz. Geertz’s original definition concerned religion as a cultural system. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. (New York. Basic Books, 1973), p. 90.

⁶ Johnston, A.I. “Thinking About Strategic Culture.” *International Security*, Vol 19, No. 4 Spring 95, p. 34.

⁷ Ethnocentricity is used as a term to describe feelings of group centrality and superiority...as a technical term to describe another culture in terms of one’s own...(or) the inability of an individual group to see the world through the eyes of a different national or ethnic group. Booth, K. 1979. *Strategy and Ethnocentricity*. New York. Holmes and Meirer Publishing, Inc. p. 14-18.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

geography, capability, threat, and a tendency of states to refrain from behaviors which clearly threaten their immediate survival.”¹⁰ The key point is that

elites socialized in different strategic cultures will make different choices when placed in similar situations. Since cultures are attributes of and vary across states, similar strategic realities will be interpreted differently. So the problem for culturalists is to explain similarities in strategic behavior across varied strategic cultures...While there is no *a priori* reason for predictions about strategic choice derived from strategic culture to be different from predictions derived from ahistorical structural approaches (any differences depend on the content of a strategic culture), there is no *a priori* reason for them to be the same either.¹¹

The overarching argument in this thesis is that the strategic culture of Spain supports a bilateral relationship with the US, along with NATO participation and EU integration into the CFSP and ESDP.

C. METHODOLOGY

Recent interpretations of strategic culture have sought rigorous and durable explanatory methods. Chapter II of this thesis will analyze the socialization and ideological orientation of Spanish elites. In Chapters III, IV and V, this thesis will develop a cognitive map of three key strategic discussions pertaining to security and defense related areas:

1. What were Spanish elite’s attitudes towards NATO integration from 1951 to 1996?
2. What are Spanish elite’s attitudes towards participation and support of non-territorial defense missions from 1982-2004?
3. How is Spain progressing towards participation and integration into the European Security and Defense Policy?

Chapter VI of this thesis will develop conclusions to how the strategic culture of Spain either contributes or hinders Spanish elite’s decision-making process towards the application of the use of force in foreign policy, security missions or military operations within the context of coalition, NATO or EU security missions.

By understanding how Spanish elites make decisions on the utilization of military force with respect to NATO operations and European Union security, this thesis first

¹⁰ De Mesquita, B. 1981. *The Time Warp*. New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press. pp. 29-30, 64 in Johnston p. 65.

¹¹ Johnston. p. 35.

demonstrates the strategic preferences of the Spanish elites. Secondly, this thesis shows that the collective identity of Spanish elites seeks further influence in regional and global policymaking. Lastly, this thesis reveals that Spain is in a unique position to develop a strong bilateral relationship with the US while furthering its security integration with the EU but is unwilling to support the furthering EU integration at expense of Spanish national interests.

Uncovering the Spanish strategic culture will provide a possible generalization to any lasting effects of the March 11 train bombings in Madrid. The question remains whether this event will lead to a shift in the Spanish strategic culture or open a new chapter in the transatlantic relationship. This thesis suggests that the bombings will not redefine the strategic culture of Spain but reinforce Spain's commitment against international terrorism. This commitment will help shape the EU's cooperation and direction on dealing with international terrorism.

II. THE SOCIALIZATION OF SPANISH POLITICAL AND MILITARY ELITES

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter lays out the roots of both conservative and liberal ideologies in modern Spanish society from 1898 to 1975. This chapter defines the political and military elites as well as follows the development of those Spanish elites through industrialization in the late 19th and early 20th century, the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera of 1923-1931, the Second Republic of 1931-1936, the Spanish Civil War from 1936-1939 and the dictatorship of Franco until 1975. In modern Spanish history, H. M. King Juan Carlos provided the appropriate leadership needed to allow for the development of democracy in Spain. The interaction in this period between political elites provides a valuable insight to the strategic culture of the Spanish government and has lasting effects on the modern political processes in Spain.

During this modern period, three critical phases affected the development of Spain's political elites. In the first phase from 1898-1931, initial clashes between conservative and liberal ideologies demonstrated the inequities brought on by uneven industrialization. The perceived weakness of the government during this period led to the direct intervention of the military. Conflicts arose between Spanish conservatives and regional nationalists that defined the ideological orientation of groups within Spanish political and military elites. As liberalism gained greater influence, a conservative backlash led to the dictatorship of General Primo De Rivera from 1923-1931. After the failure of the dictatorship to develop significant reforms for the Spanish people, liberalism again triumphed and the King signaled his willingness to allow an elected government form.

The second key phase in modern Spanish history begins from the rise of the political parties that ultimately shaped both the Second Republic and the Franco regime from 1931-1949. The Second Republic lasted from 1931-1936 and signaled a tumultuous beginning of democracy in Spain. Following the breakdown of civil society after the Second Republic, the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 led to the Franco dictatorship. Understanding the political orientation and the socialization of the Spanish elites in the

pre-Franco democracy is necessary to develop an initial understanding of the strategic culture of the Second Republic and the strategic cultures of the early Franco regime.

The final portion of this chapter deals with the effects of the shifting attitudes of the political and military elites from 1949 to 1975. Domestic as well as international concerns affected the decisions of the Spanish elites causing the creation of the climate that allowed Franco to shift his foreign policy towards the US and more normalized relations with Western Europe. Following the death of Franco in 1975, a constitutional monarchy formed with democratically elected government.

B. ROOTS OF CONSERVATISM AND LIBERALISM IN SPAIN

The conservative movement of the Spanish Right is rooted in several parts of Spanish social and political mentality. From a historical standpoint, Spanish independence began in the Eleventh century through territorial conquest and kingdom consolidation. For the next six centuries, Spain became the most dominant global power of the time. By the 17th century, unlike England, France and Austria, the Spanish monarchy was not able to develop adequate federal structures with “centralized institutions.” Consequently, the organizational arrangement of the state developed as more of a confederation of regions with a weak center allowing for various degrees of regional autonomy.¹² Because of the relative weakness of the central government to the autonomous regions, the central government had no ability to challenge this regional status quo arrangement.¹³

Traditionally, “National Catholicism” was able to resist secularization primarily because the church and its structures became identified with “culture and tradition.”¹⁴ Because Spain faced no real external threats after the defeat of Napoleon and due to its geographical location and the lack of power-projection ability in the early 20th century, Spain was able to avoid major involvement in the highly destructive wars during that time.¹⁵ Finally, “Classical liberalism dominated Spanish political life for most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, discouraging military and aggressive

¹² Schulze, H. 1996. *States, Nations and Nationalism*. Malden, Mass. Blackwell Publishers Ltd. p. 286.

¹³ Payne, S.G. 1967. *Franco's Spain*. New York. Thomas Y. Crowell Company. p. 253

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

ambitions.”¹⁶ The elitist mentality remained strong in Spain through either “classical liberalism or traditional Catholicism, discouraging the introduction or diffusion of new doctrines or philosophies except in the working class subculture.”¹⁷

In the early part of the 20th century, problems existed in Spain that resulted in regional divergences forming between the industrial and non-industrial sectors of the Kingdom. Following a similar pattern to several European countries during industrialization with the advent of Socialism, Spain was “on the threshold between an industrial and agrarian economy.”¹⁸ Desires for more regional autonomy began to take hold in the northern industrial areas that aspired to such nationalistic beliefs as those of the Catalans and the Basques. The Catalans supposed that they “had a distinct historical and cultural identity of their own” while the Basques believed that their nationality “expressed the pride and ambition of Spain.”¹⁹ While this description is a simplification of the dynamics of these two regions with respect to the government, the point remains that the divergence of these two industrial regions from the rest of the “agrarian” portions of Spain led to the formation of two distinct working class entities: the Anarcho-Syndicalists and the Socialists.²⁰

Industrialization developed unevenly through Spain. Consequently, the northern industrial regions of Euskadi (País Vasco), Aragón, Navarra and Catalunya (Cataluña) disliked sharing this new wealth with the poorer and “less educated” southern regions. Though the regions had different languages and traditions from Castilian Spain, this weak form of regional nationalism also developed unevenly. The modern Basque Country (País Vasco) and other autonomous regions of Aragón, Navarra and Catalunya developed an “inverted” form of nationalism as comparison with other forms of European nationalism. “Peripheral nationalism,” as demonstrated by the peoples of the

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Schulze p. 286.

¹⁹ Payne, S.G. 1967. *Franco's Spain*. New York. Thomas Y. Crowell Company. p. xiii.

²⁰ Anarcho-Syndicalism becomes the anarchist wing of the developing labor union movement in Spain. Its key propositions are workers' solidarity, direct action and self management. This movement became the single-most powerful force for the left and became “a force characterized by spontaneous revolutionary enthusiasm and a wild cult of liberty.” Wilkinson, J. and Hughes, H.S. 2004. *Contemporary Europe – A History (Tenth Edition)*. Upper Saddle River, NJ. Pearson Prentice Hall. P. 286.

autonomous regions of Catalan and Basque national groups, fought against the maturation of a strong Spanish nation-state.²¹

While comprised of mainly peasants and the working class, the Spanish Left in the industrial regions developed three key agenda points: increased representation in government for the working class; increased regional autonomy; and less influence of the Catholic Church in government. This liberal agenda came too quickly for the conservative portions of the government leading to the imposition of a seven-year military dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera from 1923-1931. This military action only caused the delay in the rise of this left-wing movement.²²

C. 1931-1947: BREAKDOWN OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE RISE OF FRANCO

King Alfonso XIII supported the beginning of the dictatorship and subsequently, ordered the ending of the dictatorship. The King dismissed Primo de Rivera in January 1930 because the dictator failed to instill any clear political or social doctrine. This lack of direction led to a collapse of the economy, a lack of faith from the military and no governmental consensus with the Socialists.

The total ineffectiveness of the right-wing government caused not only the failure of the dictatorship but also brought down the monarchy. The King “announced the restoration of the constitution and, as an initial token of the return of liberty, scheduled the election of municipal councilors for mid-April 1931.”²³ The campaign quickly turned into a direct vote against the continuance of the monarchy. Believing this “tidal wave” of opposition was turning hostile, King Alfonso fled the “country without abdicating.”²⁴

On April 14, 1931, the Second Republic led by the Socialist reformists such as Manuel Azaña undertook primary efforts to instill democratic order in the government. He immediately began to attack the authoritarian tendencies of the conservative right by reducing the role of the military in the government, by granting autonomy to the Basque and Catalan regions and by separating the state from the church.²⁵ The policies of the first government of the Second Republic created a backlash in the electorate due to the

²¹ Payne (1995) p. 263-64.

²² Ibid. p. 254.

²³ Wilkinson, et al. p. 284.

²⁴ Ibid. p. 285.

²⁵ Ibid. p. 286.

perceived effort of the left government to “persecute the Catholic Church...The reaction to this took the form of a new authoritarian right and victory for the center and right in the second republican elections of 1933.”²⁶

From this defeat, the left splintered from a democratic reformist platform to a more radical “Bolshevization” revolutionary ideology.²⁷ Within this divided Left, four primary parties emerged: *Partido Comunista de España* (PCE – Communist Party); *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE – Socialists); the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC – Catalan Republican Left) and *Unión Republicana* (UR – Republican Union Party).²⁸

Following the victory of the Spanish Right in the general elections of 1933, authoritarian nationalism defined this early phase of democratic Spanish politics with the Spanish Right developing three distinctive groupings: the **Fascists** (*Falange Española*); the **Radical Right**: *Carlists* (Catholic Corporatism) and *Renovación Española* (Authoritarian Monarchists) and neo-authoritarian Alfonsine monarchists (*Acción Española*); and the **Conservative Right**: Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rightist Groups (*CEDA*).²⁹

During the period from 1933-1936, *CEDA* remained the largest political party in Spain followed by the Radical Right groups of Carlists and traditional monarchists of the *Renovación Española*. The Falangists remained largely unimportant as a political party taking only 0.7% of the votes in the 1936 elections.³⁰ The primary reason for the rejection of fascism was that as long as “the regular political system” remained viable, fascism could not gain momentum.³¹

The driving force towards authoritarianism in Spain was the radical right platform developed by Jose Calvo Sotelo. Prior to the Civil War, Sotelo had become

the key leader of the small monarchists Spanish Renovation Party and organized a broader right nationalist grouping, the National Bloc, in 1934-35...Sotelo proposed not the restoration but the installation (*instauración*) of an authoritarian new monarchy, whose reign would have to be preceded by an indeterminate period of dictatorship. He understood clearly that this

²⁶ Payne (1995). p. 254.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Heywood, P. 1995. *The Government and Politics of Spain*. New York. St. Martin's Press. p. 19

²⁹ See Payne (1995) p. 15. Table 1.2 and p. 255.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 260 and 263.

³¹ Payne (1995) p. 263-64.

was unlikely to come about through political mobilization but would probably require forcible intervention by the military. Parliament would have to be replaced by an indirect corporate chamber representing social and economic interests, and a strong government would then be in a position to stimulate the economy through state regulation and reflationary policies.³²

Prior to the 1936 general elections, however, the reunified Left created an alliance - the Popular Front – that subsequently defeated the National Bloc by a narrow margin to regain control of the Spanish Parliament or *Cortes*.³³ The Popular Front government began its reformation of the government by purging much of the National Bloc right and making the *Falange Espanola* illegal.³⁴ Following a Leftist-police led assassination of Sotelo on 12 July 1936, tensions between the Left and Right ignited leading to a military uprising on 17 July 1936 and the subsequent breakdown of Spanish civil society.³⁵ This breakdown of civil society was the beginning of the Spanish Civil War.

From 1935 to 1936, the *Falangists*, led by José Antonio Primo de Rivera (son of the former dictator), received significant financial support from the Italian fascist regime allowing the party to survive the rejection from the Left and the Radical Right movements in Spain.³⁶ After the start of the Civil War, as the conservative and radical right became increasingly disenfranchised by the actions of the left, the actions and successes of the left during the civil war allowed the Falangist's party to grow.

Though disillusioned rightists – primarily the young – began to flock to the clandestine, partially disarticulated movement, the collapse of political order erased the very concept of political victory in the Italian or German senses, and even Falangists had never seen that as a practical possibility.³⁷

In 1935, the Minister of War appointed General Francisco Franco as the Chief of Staff of the Army. As a monarchist, the right wing government of Spain approved of

³² Payne (1995), p. 256.

³³ The Popular Front consisted of the PSOE (Socialists), PCE (Communists), ERC (Catalan Separatists) and the RUP (Republican Unions). See Payne, S.G. 1967. *Franco's Spain*. New York. Thomas Y. Crowell Company. p. xv.

³⁴ Payne (1995), p. 264 .

³⁵ Ibid. p. xvii

³⁶ Ibid p. 260.

³⁷ Ibid p . 264.

Franco and his brutal tactics.³⁸ While Chief of Staff of the Army, Franco systematically purged the Army hierarchy of Republican and liberal officers.³⁹

After the elections of 1936, the new Left government sent Franco to govern the Canary Islands. After the beginning of the Civil War, he flew to Tetuán, Morocco and assumed command of the Army of Africa.⁴⁰ While not involved in the initial uprising against the Republican government, Franco led his African Army into Southern Spain and seized control of Andalucía and Sevilla.⁴¹ By September 1936, the nine other generals involved in the uprising selected Franco to lead the Right-wing Nationalist Army.

At the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, Hermann Goering testified that Franco had requested assistance from Hitler. Goering knew that Franco desperately needed airlift assistance to get his army across the Mediterranean. Franco considered the option of naval transport but the forces loyal to the Republicans and Communists controlled the Spanish navy. Goering advised Hitler to give the assistance to prevent the further spread of communism and to test “his young Luftwaffe in this or that technical respect.”⁴²

The effects of foreign intervention in the Spanish Civil war cannot be over emphasized. “Franco was openly supported by large shipments of equipment from Germany and Italy; soon thereafter, German and Italian “volunteers” were dispatched, and fascism seemed poised to spread its ideas by force.”⁴³ For the Spanish liberals, no primary benefactor came forward that was willing to provide military or political support to help defeat the right-wing insurgency. The International Brigades did provide some support but they had more of an important symbolic role as the representation of the struggle for the Republic’s quest for democracy.

Communism did develop in Spain but not in the model of the Soviet Union. The Trotskyites saw the opportunity for a “new revolution” against the fascist right but Stalin saw Spain as a danger for Soviet Communism. Not wanting to antagonize the British or

³⁸ Franco was known for his brutal suppression of agrarian uprisings and brutal massacres in Morocco.

³⁹ Heywood. p. 58.

⁴⁰ The Spanish Army of 1936 consisted of two primary forces: The Peninsula Army and the Army of Africa. The Peninsula Army split but was still mostly under loyalist control. The African Army remained roughly intact and under Franco’s control during the conflict. Payne (1967).p. xvii and Wilkinson p. 287.

⁴¹ Franco received significant assistance with troop transportation from the German Luftwaffe. Preston, P. 1993. *Franco*. London. Basic Books. p. 349.

⁴² Beevor, A. 1982. *The Spanish Civil War*. London. Penguin Books. pp. 113-114.

⁴³ Kissinger, H. 1994. *Diplomacy*. New York. Simon and Schuster. pp. 307-308.

the French, Stalin “was not prepared to do much in a concrete way to combat fascism, for any support of revolution in the West would alienate the bourgeois powers...that he might need against Hitler.”⁴⁴ Stalin sent the NKVD to Spain to “liquidate” the Trotskyites and to “direct” the Spanish Communists. “Soviet involvement in Spanish affairs was directed less at supporting the Republic than at preventing it from falling into a socialist revolution.”⁴⁵

The foreign intervention or lack of assistance, as the case may be, carried consequences for the British and the French for the next several decades. The Spanish left looked to the friendly governments of Britain and France for support. Great Britain declined because of the desire to maintain neutrality but they “either failed to perceive a threat to the balance of power in a fascist victory in Spain or it perceived fascism as a lesser threat than a radical left-wing Spain tied to the Soviet Union.”⁴⁶ The British

Cabinet warned France that Great Britain reserved the right to remain neutral if a war should result from French arms deliveries to republican Spain – even though, under international law, France had every right to sell arms to the legitimate Spanish government. France waffled, then proclaimed an embargo on arms shipments while periodically acquiescing in its violation. That policy, however, only demoralized France’s friends and cost France the respect of its adversaries.⁴⁷

After the execution of José Antonio at the hands of the Republicans in April 1937, Franco assumed command of the entire right-wing movement but controlled the group with a broader approach:

The entity that Franco elevated into *partido único* in April 1937 was not, however, integral Falangism but a union of Falangists, Carlists and all the other members of various rightist and other groups who were willing to join. Though the Falangist program – now the Twenty-six Points – was raised to the official state doctrine, Franco specifically announced that this was to be understood merely as a point of departure and would be modified or elaborated depending upon future requirements.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Malia, M. 1994. *The Soviet Tragedy – A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991*. New York. The Free Press. pp. 251-252.

⁴⁵The NKVD were the Soviet secret police called into service in 1934. Ibid. p. 246 and 252.

⁴⁶ Kissinger. p. 308.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Tusell, J. 1992. *Franco en la Guerra Civil*. Madrid; and Preston p. 248-74 in Payne (1995) p. 265-66.

In reality, Franco adopted the “structures and policies” of the *Acción Española* put forth by Sotelo before his death.⁴⁹ While Franco became dictator with the help of German and Italian military and financial assistance, he ruled independently with the assistance of “an eclectic mixture of right-wing military elites, a fascist state party, and various sectors of conservatives and monarchists, all buttressed by the strong support of a revitalized neo-traditional Catholicism.”⁵⁰

In external relations, Franco’s foreign policy shifted three times during his 38 years as dictator: twice during World War II and again in 1947 towards the US. In 1938, Franco’s first policy shift was from neutral to non-belligerency towards Germany. Franco believed that Hitler betrayed him during the Sudetan crisis in 1938 by curtailing German support for the Spanish Civil War. In 1938, Franco’s strategic vision for Spain was the unity of Spain through the defeat of the Republicans. As noted, Franco was willing to accept German and Italian support for operations against the 2nd Republic of Spain to obtain this end.

Ironically, Hitler’s designs against Czechoslovakia led to Franco’s pledge of neutrality in WW II and surprisingly, the Spanish Republican’s defeat. Franco became worried in September 1938 that German aspirations in Czechoslovakia might signal an end to German and Italian support for the Spanish Nationalists. The Civil War in Spain was still in question and Franco and the Republican leader, Juan Negrin, saw the move on the Sudetan as an escalation that would allow for the alignment of the Republicans with the British, French and Russians against the Spanish Nationalists.⁵¹ Franco felt betrayed by Hitler. Franco’s forces were thin and could not withstand an attack from France in the North if such an alignment occurred. British and French governments contacted Spain to find out “what (Spain) would do in the event of a general war in Europe.”⁵²

Additionally, the US had been systematically starving the Franco regime of strategic oil reserves. The priority for the US was to deny Franco the ability to supply Germany or Italy with oil from Spanish reserves. “It was a shrewd policy which neither

⁴⁹ Payne (1995) p. 256.

⁵⁰ Ibid p. 431.

⁵¹ Preston. p. 312.

⁵² Ibid.

gave Franco the confidence to go to war nor threw him entirely on the mercy of the Third Reich.”⁵³

During the early years of transformation, Spanish governments sought to greater the economic and political ties with allies through its support of operations abroad that supported its allies. In this matter, Franco was a shrewd negotiator. On 18 Jun 1940, Franco offered to enter to the war on the side of the axis if Hitler would give Spain

war materials, heavy artillery, aircraft for the attack on Gibraltar, and perhaps the cooperation of German submarines in the defense of the Canary Islands. Also supplies of some foodstuffs, ammunition, motor fuel and equipment, which will certainly be available from the French war stocks.⁵⁴

Franco also had “colonial ambitions” in Northern Africa. Hitler, however, had strategic interests that went against the priorities of the Franco regime. Hitler was unwilling to cede any of the Northern African regions because of his agreements with France in Northern Africa.

Later in 1939, Franco maintained Spain’s position of neutrality because of Spanish perceptions towards the invasion of Poland in 1939. Franco saw too many comparisons between the Polish authoritarian, Catholic regime and his own.⁵⁵ After the fall of France in 1940, in a clear policy shift, Franco offered to enter WWII on the side of the axis but Hitler declined the assistance because the price that Franco wanted was too high economically and politically for Hitler to pay.⁵⁶ Germany was to guarantee extensive military and economic assistance, as well as “cession to Spain of much of French Northwest Africa, including all of Morocco and northwestern Algeria.”⁵⁷ Hitler would not do this because of his alliance with the Vichy French and his concerns for the Italian’s African aspirations after the war.

To Franco, Germany could accept Spanish help with the economic conditions and cessions of lands in Africa or it would get token support during the war. For example, in

⁵³ ABC. 31 July 1940. Feis. *Spanish Story*. pp. 34-53. in Preston p. 365. Also see Acheson, D. 1969. *Present at the Creation: My years in the State Department*. New York. WW Norton & Company. p. 49.

⁵⁴ Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1956. Vol IX. London. pp. 620-621; Weinberg, G.L. 1981. *World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II*. Hanover, New Hampshire p. 111 in Preston p. 364.

⁵⁵ Payne (1995) p. 430.

⁵⁶ Ibid. pp. 431-433.

⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 431.

1942, Franco would not allow Germany to transit Spain to seize Gibraltar fearing British reprisals in the Canary Islands.

With the early success of Germany in WWII, the fascists within the Spanish regime demanded more power. Franco saw this development along with other domestic concerns as a challenge brought on by the Falangists. In 1942, Franco “adroitly” handled this balance of domestic control problem by allowing 20,000 Falangist volunteers (Falangist Blue Shirt Division) to fight with the Germans while supporting the German invasion of Russia.⁵⁸ By allowing these volunteers to leave, Franco provided reciprocal support for Hitler as well as reducing the internal threat of the Falangists in Spain.

Franco saw the advantage of maintaining normalized relations with Germany. In 1939, over 500,000 Republican refugees left Spain for France. While Germany still maintained control over the territory of France, the Spanish Republicans had no clear marshalling area to launch a serious offensive against the Franco regime. Consequently, the Republican movement weakened during WWII and slowly degenerated into small guerilla activities with limited successes after 1949.⁵⁹

The strategic preferences of the early Franco regime centered on the maintenance of the Franco’s control of the Spanish state. Franco gave support if that support would either further the territorial ambitions of the *Caudillo* or maintain Franco’s unchallenged position within Spain. While the basic premise of the Franco regime did not change after WW II, Franco had to seek international support to maintain control of the country.

Following the Civil War and the post-WW II isolation, the Spanish regime had little international legitimacy. A conjuncture of events led to the reversal of this international ostracism of Spain: the redefinition of the Spanish Right, a shift in the foreign policy of Franco and the increased threat of worldwide communism.

The redefinition of the Spanish right began with the reinstitution of the Monarchy in 1947. Franco reinstituted the monarchy in 1947 but retained the power of Regent for life. “Through an arrangement with Don Juan, son of Alfonso XIII, Franco was able to groom Juan Carlos as his successor, supervising the prince’s education in Spain from an early age.”⁶⁰ In another redefinition of the right, starting in 1942 and through 1951,

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 434.

⁵⁹ Payne (1967). p. 116.

⁶⁰ Heywood p. 47.

Franco began the defascistization of the Spanish government. While *Falange Espanola* remained the only authorized party in Spain after 1945, the members began to redefine themselves into a political party that resembled an

image as that of a Catholic, organic, and corporative system, based on church, professionalism, municipality, and family – a system that supposedly had never favored the Axis or sought to imitate it politically.⁶¹

Wanting to shed the fascist label, Spain had redefined itself by 1947 as a “corporative, Catholic monarchy.”⁶² Moreover, the unified right wing changed its name from *Falange Espanola* to the *Movimiento Nacional*. Additionally, the Catholic Church gained further influence through the *Opus Dei* gaining much political support through its ties with the Catholic Church, consequently with Franco, thereby influencing, and liberalizing the political and economic processes that would allow for technological and economic modernization.⁶³

A key strength of the Franco regime came from the loyalty and support that Franco received from the military. Franco maintained a special relationship with his generals allowing the military to gain from this rapport. From 1938-1945, the Spanish military held 46% of all ministerial positions and 37% of all other positions within the government. Franco utilized the Army in Spain primarily for the internal suppression of rebellion and regional nationalism. He “deliberately sought to instill in the armed forces a narrow preoccupation with internal rather than external threats to Spain, thereby building upon a tradition of military intervention which has its roots in the early nineteenth century.”⁶⁴

D. 1947-1975: CONSOLIDATION OF THE FRANCO REGIME

As for an analysis of the Spanish army during the dictatorship, critics describe three main factors that shaped the Spanish army. First, the military had too many officers for the number of conscripted personnel. Consequently, the officers “tended to be too old for their rank and responsibilities.”⁶⁵ Second, “the Spanish army frequently responded to a self-defined notion of patriotism...defending Spain from allegedly incompetent

⁶¹ Payne (1995). p. 431.

⁶² Ibid. p. 435.

⁶³ *Movimiento Nacional* became the “Franco regime’s institutional framework.” See Heywood pp. xiii, 70-74.

⁶⁴ Heywood. p. 58.

⁶⁵ As of 1977, the Army still had one officer to every 6-7 conscripts with 340 Generals. Ibid.

politicians.”⁶⁶ Third, the Spanish armed services “demonstrated an acute sensitivity to civilian criticism, intensified by widespread popular hostility to conscription and the regular use of the army to crush social agitation.”⁶⁷

In fact, the Army responded more due to the political weakness of the government than to any desire to instill a singular ideological position. Franco’s generals benefited from a “special relationship” with the *Caudillo* that gave them “greater potential veto power than any other single group, not excluding the Church hierarchy.”⁶⁸ Because of this relationship, however, the Army did not challenge the “political structure of the state.”⁶⁹

By 12 December 1946, the United Nations had enacted a resolution against the Franco regime that was the basis for the systematic international ostracism of his regime. In doing so, Franco was able to pit his struggle as an epic contest between the powerful West and the struggling Spain. While keeping this “heroic struggle” for Spanish independence from tyranny in the domestic forefront, “Franco and Carrero Blanco put considerable effort into making his regime acceptable to the same western democracies.”⁷⁰

With the changing international environment between the US and the Soviet Union in January 1947, Franco began to see the opportunity to develop Spain’s relationship with Washington. In March 1947, Franco dispatched José Félix de Lequerica to Washington to create a Spanish lobby targeting “influential American Catholics, anti-Communists, military planners, anti-Truman Republicans and businessmen with interests in Spain.”⁷¹ While the Spanish lobby could count on support from influential Senators like Joseph McCarthy, Republican Senator from Wisconsin, the lobby gained quick support from “the deeply Catholic” Senator Pat McCarran of the

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Payne (1967). p. 43.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Admiral Blanco was a long time strategic advisor for Franco. Preston. p. 564.

⁷¹ Mesa, C. 1963. *Lequerica*. pp. 265-310; Lowi, T.J. “Bases in Spain” in Stein, H. ed. 1963. *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies*. Birmingham, AL. pp. 675-676. Rubottom, R. & Murphey, JC. 1984. *Spain and the United States since World War II*. New York. pp. 10-11; Viñas. *Guerra, dictadura, dinero*. pp. 284-287; Whitacker. *Spain*. pp. 32-34. in Preston p. 581.

Senate Appropriations Committee who began pushing Dean Acheson and the US State Department towards normalized relations with Spain.⁷²

By February 1949, the Spanish lobby in the US made considerable ground in developing its relationship with the US Congress and then the US State Department. The Truman administration, behind inquiries from Republican Leader Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg, Democratic Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connelly and Judge John Lee, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, became compelled to consider normalizing relations with Spain. With pressure from McCarran, Acheson wrote a letter on 18 January 1950

admitting that the 1946 (UN) resolution had failed...(and) that the United States was prepared to vote for a resolution permitting member nations to send ambassadors to Madrid and Spain admitted to international technical agencies. Referring to the political origins of the regime, Acheson indicated that fuller integration into Western Europe, including presumably NATO, would require political liberalization in Spain.⁷³

Spain was able to secure a loan for \$25 million with Spanish gold as collateral from Chase Manhattan and National City Banks of New York.⁷⁴ Moreover, during the period covered by the Marshall Plan from 1949-1952, the US loaned Spain approximately \$52.7 million and provided another \$100,000 in grants for the Food for Peace program.⁷⁵ While this amount paled in comparison to other contributions to other post-WW II recipients, the payment demonstrated a change in the perception of the US towards the Spanish regime.

As the Spanish extreme right began to move towards a more centrist position, Franco and the Spanish government became more palatable to the liberal west because of Spain's strong anti-communist views, the communistic threat in France and Italy and Spain's strategic location. The US Joint Chiefs also continued to press for the reversal of

⁷² Preston p. 581 and 592.

⁷³ FRUS 1950, Vol III. pp. 1549-55; Franks to FO., 19 January 1950, FO371/89496, WS10345/3, WS10345/4; Hoyer-Miller to Bevin, 13 February 1950, FO371/89496, WS10345/13 in Preston 593.

⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 587.

⁷⁵ "Spain became the only European country to receive aid through the European Cooperation Administration without belonging to the Marshall Plan." United States Agency for International Development – US Overseas Loans & Grants Online. Country Data – Spain. http://esdb.cdie.org/cgi-bin2/broker.exe?_program=gbkprogs.ctypage_2.sas&_service=default&type=std&output=2&cocode=4ESP (Accessed April 2004) and Preston p. 602fn.

the US position towards the Franco regime.⁷⁶ While “Truman’s attitude towards Franco did not change” towards Spain, paranoia swept the US Administration over the spread of communism and the ability of the US military to defend Europe.⁷⁷

With the doubts growing about the West’s defensive capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed for an alliance with Spain in order to be able to use Iberia as ‘the last foothold in continental Europe’ without which re-entry into Soviet-held Europe might not be possible. At first, Truman regarded the demands of General Omar Bradley, chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as politically unrealistic.⁷⁸

After World War II, the United States became increasingly concerned with security in Western Europe. With the revelation of the Soviet atomic bomb, the victory of Mao Tse-Tung in China and the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, Franco understood Spain’s position within the scope of the developing power positions in Europe and the perceived threat of communism by Western powers.⁷⁹ Western governments were coming to the same realization. President Truman was willing to maintain a policy of containment against the Soviet Union but the actions of North Korea on 24 June 1950 changed the “strategy of containment to a more aggressive response to Soviet expansionism.”⁸⁰ The Spanish lobby in Washington began a campaign of support for the US against the actions of the communists and declared, “Spain had a half a million men to resist” in Korea as part of the international force if the US would arm its troops.⁸¹

In Europe, however, Spanish efforts for reintegration were not successful. By September 11, 1950 in London, the foreign office realized that the policy of ostracism towards Spain was not effective and that Spain should be brought “back into the international community, ‘despite Franco.’” However, after lengthy considerations, Bevin decided that there should be no change.⁸² NATO, however, provided the necessary links for the US to pressure Western European leaders to “include Spain,” if not in the

⁷⁶ Preston. p. 598.

⁷⁷ Memorandum of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, 3 May, to Truman to Acheson, 16 June 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol III, pp. 1560-2 in Preston. p. 598.

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 598.

⁷⁹ Ibid. pp. 598-599.

⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 599.

⁸¹ Burrows (Washington) to Young, 4 September 1950. FO371/89503, WS1051/69 in Preston p. 599.

⁸² Younger to Bevin, 3 August 1950, FO371/89502, WS1031/39; W.I. Mallet to Bevin, 2 August 1950, 11 September 1950, FO371/89503, WS1051/63 in Preston p. 599.

Alliance, with diplomatic and economic reintegration because of the “strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula.”⁸³

1. 1953 Bases Pact

The North Korea assault ignited a flurry of diplomatic activity between the US and Spain. “On 31 October 1950, the Special Ad Hoc Political Committee meeting at Lake Success, New York, voted to drop the December 1946 resolutions on withdrawal of ambassadors.”⁸⁴ By 19 January 1951, Truman named Stanton Griffis, Ambassador to Spain.⁸⁵ This diplomatic activity paved the way for direct conversations between Griffis and Franco. On 31 March 1951, Truman instructed Griffis to discuss the religious repression of Protestants in Northern Spain with Franco. Unless the *Caudillo* would make a gesture towards loosening of the religious persecution of Protestants, Truman would be unable to sustain support for Spain in budget discussions for the following year. Franco acquiesced and declared that he would discuss the matter at the next cabinet meeting.⁸⁶

Having seemingly solved the religious hurdles that would take ten years for Franco to take seriously, Griffis began discussing defense related issues.

Griffis then asked Franco directly if he was prepared to join NATO. The Caudillo replied that he thought a bilateral pact with the United States more appropriate. Griffis, aware of the views of the United States’ other allies, replied that separate negotiations with Spain would be difficult. He then asked Franco if he would be prepared to send them Spanish troops to fight with American and other NATO forces beyond the Pyrenees. After some prevarication, and pressure from Griffis, Franco said that he would collaborate in a wider defense effort. Griffis pushed even further, asking Franco outright if, in the event of conversations between the Spanish and American general staffs, Spain might put her air, land, and naval bases at the disposal of the USA. Franco replied that the two world wars had shown that all nations belonged to great coalitions and, that being the case, the military bases would be made available to the western allies although they would remain Spanish.⁸⁷

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 600.

⁸⁵ Griffis had dealings in Spain since 1943 as “an emissary of Colonel William Donovan of the Office of Strategic Services.” He was not, however, a professional diplomat. His background was as “an investment banker with interests in the entertainment business, including Paramount Pictures and the Madison Square Garden boxing arena.” Preston. p. 604.

⁸⁶ Preston. p. 610.

⁸⁷ Griffis, S. *Lying in State*. pp. 269-270; Balfour to Young, 28 March 1951, FO371/96183, WS1071/36; Viñas, *Los pactos*. pp. 73-9 in Preston p. 610.

The British and the French opposed Spain's inclusion into the North Atlantic Alliance. The continued controversy over Gibraltar stood in the way of furthering the relations between Britain and Spain. While the Spanish and the British maintained diplomatic relationships, Franco's aggressive rhetoric placed the British in the same category as the Moors whereby Franco could be a "great warrior leader of Spanish history. Just as the Catholic kings had expelled the Moors, he would like to expel the infidel freemasons of perfidious Albion."⁸⁸ Franco organized Falangist rallies and student demonstrations in support of the quest for the return of Gibraltar. In reality, Franco maintained this position to draw attention away from his negotiations with the US without interference from the Falangists still within his government.⁸⁹ Additionally, the French did not like the prospects of the Spanish rearmament to the South and that an agreement with Spain would mean, "that in the event of a Soviet attack, the US would abandon France and dig in behind the Pyrenees."⁹⁰ Regardless of the motives, "European political opinion remained unremittingly hostile to Franco and...ensure(d) that Spain would never enter NATO while he was in power."⁹¹ Franco, as well, maintained a certain level of hostility towards the European members of NATO because of Portugal's inclusion into the Alliance. The fact that NATO would admit Portugal and not Spain demonstrated the "hypocrisy" of the European members of the alliance.⁹²

While no European country was willing to allow Spain to enter the alliance, the US pressure on the alliance resulted in Western European governments reconsidering their positions towards the Spanish government. As a result, France reopened its borders with Spain and other administrations reestablished ambassadorial and diplomatic ties with Spain.⁹³

The political pressure from the pro-Spain congressional members combined with the US military's resolve to strengthen their European defenses drove Truman to submit to the wishes of the Joint Chiefs. NSC-68 provided the momentum for developing

⁸⁸ Preston. p. 601.

⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 602.

⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 616.

⁹¹ Ibid. p. 605.

⁹² Ibid. p. 607

⁹³ Even though the Western ambassadors had left Spain, a diplomatic presence remained with small staffs. Payne (1967). p. 39.

bilateral relations with Spain. Under NSC-68, the report to the US President recommended that he should

direct the National Security Council, under the continuing direction of the President...to coordinate and insure the implementation of the Conclusions herein on an urgent and continuing basis for as long as necessary to achieve our objectives. For this purpose, representatives of the member Departments and Agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their deputies, and other Departments and Agencies as required should be constituted as a revised and strengthened staff organization under the National Security Council to develop coordinated programs for consideration by the National Security Council.⁹⁴

In light of this, Truman stated to Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, “I don’t like Franco and I never will but I won’t let my personal feelings override the convictions of you military men.”⁹⁵

By April 1951, the Commander-in-Chief Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean had been instructed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to make contact with the appropriate Spanish military authorities to lay down the basis for future co-operation and for the establishment of American air and naval bases on Spanish territory.⁹⁶

Admiral Richard L. Conolly, Commander of US Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean pushed for sea bases in Spain. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson, “who had initiated an economy programme which had cut plans for a big expansion of the US aircraft-carrier fleet, Johnson was particularly interested in land bases for American bombers.”⁹⁷

Franco realized the implications of having foreign troops on Spanish territory but the domestic situation for his country was worsening. “Per capita meat consumption in Spain in 1950 was only half of what it had been in 1926 and bread consumption only half of what it had been in 1936.”⁹⁸ Without foreign assistance, the strikes and general unrest prevalent had the potential to escalate into a challenge of Franco’s control over the

⁹⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States. 1951, Vol 1. “NSC 68: The United States Objectives and Programs for National Security.” Washington, DC. Government Printing Office, 1979.

⁹⁵As the Sixth-Fleet Commander, Sherman visited his son-in-law (the assistant naval attaché in Madrid) and daughter in Madrid on several occasions and realized the “geostrategic importance of Spain to the USA.” Preston p. 590 and 612.

⁹⁶ Preston p. 612.

⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 591.

⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 608

country. “The logic of the situation demanded Spain’s integration into the international economy and more American credit.”⁹⁹

On 16 July 1951, Franco met with CNO Admiral Sherman and he provided Franco with the “American needs in terms of air bases and anchorage facilities for aircraft-carriers.”¹⁰⁰ Franco responded strategically in that “bases to the USA would provoke an immediate attack from the Soviet Air Force and claimed that Spanish forces needed to bring to a point at which they could resist the Russians.”¹⁰¹

“Franco’s desire to squeeze the highest price possible was overridden by his feverish anxiety to clinch a deal.”¹⁰² Franco made his cabinet and military staffs immediately available for negotiations to begin. Franco also reshuffled his cabinet by including General Agustin Munoz as the Minister of War and Gabriel Arias Salgado as the Minister of Information and Tourism. This move reinforced the cabinet’s anti-communism slant by placing General Munoz, who had led the Blue Division against the Soviets in WW II and awarded the Iron Cross by Hitler, as the Minister of War. Additionally, Salgado had controlled the Spanish press during WW II that supported the rhetoric towards the interests of the Germans.¹⁰³ While this move seemed to contradict the de-falangization of the Spanish regime,

the political obsolescence of the Falange meant that Franco could count absolutely on the loyalty of those who had nowhere else to go. He knew that by making the Falangists accomplices in the surrender of sovereignty to the United States he could diminish any possible nationalist backlash.¹⁰⁴

Critics of the foundational negotiations claim that the Spanish negotiators were not well prepared for this type of bilateral negotiations with the US. For example, the US was able to drive the content of the military agreements because of the lack of international experience of the negotiators. At the heart of this agreement was the activation clause whereby US forces “would be allowed to activate or put in a state of alert the bases and military facilities in view of their use in armed conflict.”¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid pp. 612-613.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. p. 613.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid. p. 614.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Viñas. 2003. p. 8.

As for Spanish interests, General Franco set the economics and financial arrangements as the priority for the Spanish negotiators. Franco relied on his Commerce Minister, Manuel Arburua; his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Martín Artajo; and, his key strategic advisor, Admiral Blanco to ensure that the agreement were in Spain's national interests. At this level, the Spanish negotiators were able to gain considerable concessions and guarantees against US negotiators who bargained but hedged with their lack of control of the US Congressional budgetary process.¹⁰⁶

In January 1952, the negotiations dragged on as Truman replaced Griffis with Lincoln McVeagh. The bulk of the negotiations were still in the hands of the US military but Truman continued to express his displeasure at the treatment of Protestants in Spain by the open discrimination of Protestant book burnings in Badajoz “and the subsequent arson at a British Protestant Church in Seville.” Franco began to worry about the slowness of the negotiations and sent a “conciliatory letter to Truman in late February.”¹⁰⁷ As the repression in Spain continued to overshadow the negotiations for the economic and military assistance, Franco looked to the 1952 US Presidential elections with anticipation. Franco's “hopes lay with the (US) Republicans, assuming that the favorite, Eisenhower, would regard him with considerably more sympathy than Truman.”¹⁰⁸

After Eisenhower was sworn in, the President replaced McVeagh with James C. Dunn, the former Ambassador to France. On 9 April 1953, Dunn met with Franco and Martín Artajo expressing the President's desire to finish the deal. The settlement could have progressed more rapidly if not for Franco's misconception fed by Artajo that the American had wanted the deal more than they did. As the Americans threatened to abandon the agreement, Franco, through the military's chief negotiator, Lieutenant General Juan Vigón, became forced to accept the deal and to adopt “what was virtually an American text.”¹⁰⁹

Finally, on 26 September 1953, the governments of the US and Spain signed the Pact of Madrid as a 10-year bilateral “executive agreement on defense – including twenty-two secret clauses signed between 1954 and 1960 though not made public until

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p. 9.

¹⁰⁷ Preston p. 618.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 620.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 621.

1981 – (authorizing) the USA to maintain and utilize military installations.”¹¹⁰ In this agreement, Franco allowed the US to build airbases at Torrejón de Ardoz, Sanjurjo Valenzuela and Morón de la Frontera. The US also built a naval base at Rota, Cadiz, a sophisticated radar system for air traffic control and an oil pipeline linking Rota with Zaragoza.¹¹¹ By 1965, this arrangement contributed approximately \$1.8 billion US dollars to the Spanish economy.¹¹² Because the US bore the cost of the upgrade to the Spanish military, Franco was able to devote large amounts of money for hydroelectric development and infrastructure advancements.

The motivation behind this Spain’s entrance into this agreement seems evident. Franco looked to take advantage of the international and US perceptions towards the spread of communism. Franco was also able to take advantage of the deal with the US by receiving military equipment from the US.

While this equipment was not state of the art, the equipment provided a significant upgrade for the Spanish military. US presence could also bring a certain level of stability to the region both internally and externally. For the US, the “Franco model of deterrence” would dissuade the collective uprising from the vanquished left and externally, provide stability in “security scenarios in Northern Africa.”¹¹³

In April 1954, the US congress amended the Mutual Security Act of 1951 to reflect the changes that spelled out the technical agreements between the two countries as well as its policies and distribution of funds to Spain and other European nations.¹¹⁴ The subsequent consultations between American economic advisors and Spain’s economic ministers led to the environment that made Spain’s inclusion into the Bretton Woods institutions possible.¹¹⁵ Franco declared to the *Cortes* that “he had not ceded any national sovereignty in the negotiations.”¹¹⁶ Franco, however, had not explained all of the technical agreements between the two nations. In fact, wartime activations and

¹¹⁰ The US Congress also cites the agreement under the Mutual Security Act of 1954. Heywood. p. 286, 3.2fn.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Payne (1967). p. 38.

¹¹³ Viñas, A. September 2003. Negotiating the U.S.-Spanish Agreements, 1953-1988: A Spanish Perspective. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 3. No. 7. University of Miami. p. 4.

¹¹⁴ US Department of Defense. 15 March 1954. Directive No. 2000.3. “Technical Property Interchange Agreements.”

¹¹⁵ Viñas. 2003. p. 4.

¹¹⁶ Preston. p. 623.

military actions originating from Spanish territory with respect to Spanish sovereignty remained a point of contention that continued to surface during the 1963, 1968, 1976 and 1981 negotiations.

While the 1953 Pact of Madrid contained no guarantees for collective security, the US would provide protection in the event of a communist attack. The US was under no obligation to intercede against any “non-communist aggressor.”¹¹⁷ The subsequent renegotiations 1963 did create a “Joint Consultative Committee to discuss mutual problems between the two countries.”¹¹⁸ Within this renewal was a clause that “specifically stated that any threat to Spain itself would be viewed as a matter of ‘common concern’ by the United States Government.”¹¹⁹

On emergency activation, the US only had to “communicate the information at its disposal and its intentions to the government of Spain.”¹²⁰ The US also made clear to Spanish representatives that NATO was the primary focus for rearmament. In effect, Spain became armed with the “equipment surplus to the general NATO arms build-up, weapons, aircraft and vehicles already used in the Second World War and/or Korea.”¹²¹

Several US administrations utilized the technical agreements for activations of the US military during the Franco period of the Pact. The Spanish administration allowed the activation of the bases in Spain during the 1958 Lebanon crisis. Amid the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, however, the Kennedy Administration exercised the activation clause without complete consultation with the Spanish administration. The Spanish government “did not know whether the crisis was taking place in the Caribbean or Berlin.”¹²²

The US also sought to establish “facilities to track nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and under sea, for setting up new radar facilities and, more importantly, for expanding the berthing facilities at Rota naval base. The

117 “In the event of Communist aggression, or imminence thereof, which threatens the security of the West, U.S. forces may immediately make such use of agreed areas and facilities stipulated in this agreement as may be necessary for the defense of the West; provided that when the need for such use becomes apparent, the United States will immediately so inform the Spanish Government. Should the United States wish to use the agreed areas and facilities for combat purposes as a result of the emergence of any other situation than above specified, such use will be subject to prior consultations between the two Governments.” FRUS 1952-1954, vol. VI, doc. 885.

118 Heywood. p. 38.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.

121 Preston p. 623.

122 Viñas. 2003. p. 22

idea was to introduce in Rota the modern submarines with the Polaris missiles.¹²³

By 1962, “NATO governments were not anxious to see Polaris missiles in their harbors or territories.” The US military, however, eager for a solution, bypassed the political hierarchy and brokered a deal with a Spanish military official, Captain General Munoz Grandes. “He saw no objection in granting the US request. Spanish diplomats were neither consulted nor informed.”¹²⁴

A rapport developed between the US military and the Spanish military that had significant strategic consequences. The US requested basing support in 1964 for actions in the Congo and the Spanish government supported the request. The low point in the history of the bilateral relationship occurred in January 1966 when two US aircraft collided off the coast of Spain over the Mediterranean during a refueling mission of aircraft carrying nuclear ordnance. One aircraft inadvertently jettisoned four H-Bombs near Palomares, Spain. A diplomatic scandal emerged with an attempted military cover up.¹²⁵ The US military justified the action through the belief that the technical agreements gave them the authorization to act unilaterally within the territory of Spain.

On the basis of the working of the relevant arrangements concluded in the fifties, the United States saw no difficulty in introducing nuclear weapons into Spain and in extensively carrying out overflights of the Spanish territory with nuclear weapons.¹²⁶

Although Spanish diplomats sought to correct this during the 1968 negotiations concerning “Article VII of the 1953 (and secret) agreement,” a general inability of the Spanish bureaucracy prevailed that could not bridge the “rivalry between the civilian and military sectors of the Franco regime.”¹²⁷ In September 1969, the US requested activation of Saragossa Air Base after Colonel Ghadafi’s coup in Libya. Demonstrating the lack of cooperation between the Spanish political leadership and military, the Spanish government granted the request but failed to take advantage of their increased bargaining position with any future dealings with the US.

¹²³ Ibid. p. 11.

¹²⁴ Ibid. p. 12.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid. p. 13.

With a reinforced confidence in their leader, a corresponding change occurred with the Spanish military from 1953-1966, also. While the military did not move to a centrist position, the military became increasingly “apolitical.”¹²⁸ The armed forces became more “strictly professional” during this period.¹²⁹ Ironically, the liberals that had denounced the military for their part in the 1936 Civil War, had by 1966, grown frustrated with the military for not having “any distinct political role among officers” that might bring an end to the Franco dictatorship. In reality, a seemingly equitable power balance had formed between the military and other political elites. Because Franco was able to develop and implement stronger state structures with funding and material support from the US, the military became confident in the ability of the political elites to guide the government.

Domestically, the military remained loyal to Franco and his decision to reinstate the monarchy. Because of the fact that Franco had approved of the Prince’s accession to the throne, His Majesty King Juan Carlos retained the support from the military and the right wing parties after Franco’s death in 1975. The new king had to deal with the left’s assertions of being a puppet of the military and the right wing.

However, the very fact that it was Juan Carlos himself who initiated proceedings in the transition to democracy ensured that there was never any real likelihood that the republican ambitions of the leftist opposition would be realized.¹³⁰

After the initiation of the democratic process by the King, three primary groups of Spanish elites emerge from the post-Franco regime from 1975-1982 that affected the initial development of the Spanish Constitution, European Community and NATO integration – the *PSOE*, the *Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD)* and the military. The transformed *PSOE* was not the same institution that fled Spain after the civil war. In September 1979, the *PSOE* dropped Marxism from its official party’s mandate to become more acceptable to the voting populace.¹³¹ The *PSOE* still clung to its basic desires for a Republic with more power to the autonomous regions, less influence of the Catholic Church in government and greater social freedoms.

¹²⁸ Payne (1967). p. 43.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Heywood. p. 39.

From 1975-1981, the *UCD* developed from “the younger Falangists, Catholics out of government, and younger technocrats, civil servants and administrators,” leading the country through the initial transition period.¹³² The center *UCD* party, under the leadership of Adolfo Suárez, sought both NATO and EC integration as a means to improve Spain’s economy, increase Spain’s political status in Europe and continue its bilateral relations with the US.¹³³

The transitional period between the right-dominated Franco bureaucracies to the democratically elected transitional government sought to bring a balance between the increasing influence of the liberals in government and the vestiges of Franco’s regime. In this change, the Spanish left began a systematic rejection of the symbols and structure of its authoritarian past. Remaining, though, was the 1953 basing agreement with the US and accompanying technical agreements but negotiations between the Spanish and US diplomats indicated distinctive differences between the strategic preferences of the *PSOE* from the negotiated settlements of the Franco regime towards the Pact and its subsequent agreements.

The military played a significant role in maintaining the Franco regime’s power through its repression of social uprisings. The military became the guardians of the conservative movements because of its hatred for the communistic left and left’s threat against “traditional values” of Spanish conservatives. During the time of Franco, the military preserved the conservative domination of the Franco regime because of the military’s perceptions of the liberal left’s political weakness and its support of communism. After the democratic transition, the military ceased to be a concern once the government was able to dispel the concerns of the military over the direction of the Spanish democracy.

This chapter provided an explanation of the dynamics between the conservative and liberal movements in Spain. The following chapter demonstrates the differing styles of governance between the left and right that led Spain to its initial integration into Western defensive structures and finally into NATO. The military also underwent a

¹³² Ibid p. 70-74.

¹³³ Mansito, F. Representative Adjunct of Spain to the Political and Security Committee of the European Union. Interview. 10 December 2003. Spanish Embassy of Belgium, Brussels, BE.

transformation during this period that King Juan Carlos influenced with much needed leadership.

III. SPANISH VIEWS ON NATO INTEGRATION FROM 1951 TO 1996

A. INTRODUCTION

Strategic necessity and styles of governance play important roles in the development of Spain's integration into the Western defense structures. This chapter charts the development of the strategic necessity to include Spain into Western defense – first with a bilateral agreement with the US and later as a participating member of the Atlantic Alliance. The purpose of this chapter is to uncover the motivation and thought processes of the Spanish elites that guided this integration to develop the strategic culture of Spain.

Spain formally joined NATO in 1982 but the foundation of the Spanish integration and participation in Western defense structures began in 1951. The signing of the agreement between Spain and the US administration led to military and economic cooperation through the 1953 Pact of Madrid. The Pact, covered under the US Legislation under the Mutual Defense Act of 1954 and NSC-68, laid the foundation for Spain's eventual NATO integration.

The development of the bilateral relationship between Spain and the US during this period underscores how strategic necessity overrode the moral indignation of Franco's authoritarianism. Because of the bilateral relationship with the US, Franco was able to strengthen his regime allowing him to remain in control of Spain until his death in 1975. The subsequent political backlash against the Spanish right in the Post-Franco transition defined how the new Spanish government would seek NATO integration in 1981-1982. NATO integration ultimately helped to resolve the question of civil control over the military and provided a key insight on the political flexibility that the *PSOE* demonstrated during the negotiations. This chapter will also discuss the role of the monarchy in quieting the military's concerns over the perceived political weakness of the Spanish government.

B. POST FRANCO NEGOTIATIONS

The greatest change in the bilateral relationship between the US and Spain occurred when Franco died on 20 November 1975 and Juan Carlos assumed the throne on

22 November. Initially, King Juan Carlos proposed no significant changes for the direction of the transition for change and swore in Carlos Arias Navarro as Prime Minister.¹³⁴ Navarro was a loyal *Francoist* but was “torn between” maintaining the authoritarian government and reforming a government suitable to the liberals that sought liberal change. As a result, Navarro failed to institute any significant reforms while failing to satisfy the right’s demands for the governmental status quo. In effect,

Navarro’s position reflected the dilemma affecting the entire regime. Whilst personally committed to the purpose and values of the reactionary Franco regime, Arias (Navarro) was...aware – in the light of growing pressure from an evermore confident opposition – of the need for some form of change.¹³⁵

In the matter of maintaining the authoritarian government or reformation, King Juan Carlos set the tone for the transformation by announcing to the US Congress during a state visit on 2 June 1976 of his intentions to introduce democracy to Spain.¹³⁶ Because of Navarro’s “hapless” leadership, the King replaced Navarro with Adolfo Suárez after Navarro’s “forced” resignation on 1 July 1976. As a political insider, Suárez was able to influence other members of Franco’s *Movimiento Nacional* party and was able to develop the transitional Law of Political Reform that paved the way for the development of a constitution.¹³⁷

The Spanish elites also became interested in redefining the bilateral relationship with the US. In 1976, the *UCD* negotiated the withdrawal of the Polaris missiles and submarines from Rota and elevated the executive agreements with the US to the status of a treaty.¹³⁸ This political recognition of the constitutional monarchy set the stage for subsequent bilateral negotiations with the US.

With the newfound political confidence, the Spanish government was able to develop a foundation for substantive domestic reforms. Because of the pluralistic composition of the Constitutional Committee of the Congress, the Spanish elites

¹³⁴ Heywood. p. 38.

¹³⁵ Ibid.p. 40.

¹³⁶ Ibid. p. 41.

¹³⁷ The Law of Political Reform “demanded respect for the legal provisions of the Franco regime in order that those very provisions could be undone.” Heywood p. 41.

¹³⁸ Viñas. 2003. p. 17.

established specific legislation that allowed for the development of a Constitution in 1978 with free elections by 1979.¹³⁹ In 1980, the UCD also sought to join NATO.¹⁴⁰

Understanding the political change in the relationship between the US and Spain, the *UCD* entered the 1981-1982 negotiations ambitiously in attempting “to restrict to the maximum extent possible the large margins of maneuver that the United States enjoyed in using the bases and facilities.”¹⁴¹ Still, the new Spanish government remained politically weak and became compelled to downgrade the “legal basis of the relationship to the level of executive agreements once again.”¹⁴² In spite of this, the 1982 agreement demonstrated that the new Spanish democracy had a fundamentally new “institutional arrangement for the US forces in Spain” and that the foundation existed for Spanish inclusion into the Atlantic Alliance.¹⁴³

In 1981, integration into NATO was seen as a priority for the new government under Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo to gain control of the military and gain “greater respect for democracy within an army renowned for its propensity to interfere in domestic politics.”¹⁴⁴ The Spanish political elites had a tense relationship towards the military leading directly to the desire to join NATO. In effect, NATO membership became a means to restructure and control the military, in particular the Army. Another factor influencing the decision to join NATO was the hope to modernize the Spanish forces under a more western model. Modernization resulted in the restructuring of Spanish forces under civilian control, modernizing equipment and updating doctrine to come in line with NATO standards.

By 1982, NATO integration became problematic. While the desire to reintegrate into the European Community was widely popular, integration into NATO became challenging because integration into the Atlantic Alliance was of secondary importance to the *PSOE*. Because of now public documents showing Franco’s ties with the US, many Spaniards from the left viewed the US and subsequently NATO with contempt.

¹³⁹ Heywood. p. 286.4fn.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 262.

¹⁴¹ Ibid. p. 18.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Mr. Sotelo became Prime Minister after the resignation of Mr. Suárez in January 1981. Heywood. p. 265.

The Socialists were apprehensive of the US because of the US's support for Franco since 1953 with money and equipment from the basing rights.¹⁴⁵

Moreover, the Spanish left did not trust the US due to its "interventionist policies in Latin America."¹⁴⁶ The *UCD*, however, maintained its stance to integrate into both the EC and NATO. This stance provided a political opportunity for the *PSOE* in the 1982 general elections. To illustrate this point, "Opinion polls in late 1981 showed 44 per cent of the population opposed (NATO) membership, with just 14 per cent in favor."¹⁴⁷

C. NATO REFERENDUM

While the *UCD* completed its accession talks with NATO in May 1982, the *PSOE* politicized the decision by promising a referendum concerning the issue of NATO membership if elected to office. The *PSOE*, instead, preferred a bilateral security relationship with the US with a negotiated agreement to draw down the presence of the US in Spain.¹⁴⁸ This stance provided the catalyst for an overwhelming victory for the *PSOE* and Felipe González during the October 1982 elections. The European Community members of NATO placed pressure on the new government of Spain to remain within the Alliance. As Paul Heywood points out though, "Felipe González soon discovered that the issue of NATO membership was inextricably linked to Spain's application to join the EC."¹⁴⁹ Pressure from joint EC and NATO members explained to Spain that in order to benefit from the economic and political arrangements of the EC Spain would need to share the defense burden of full integration with NATO.¹⁵⁰ In spite of this, Spanish elites remained united in their goal to integrate into the economic and political structures of the European Community.

Before the October 1982 elections, the *UCD* negotiated the burden-sharing agreements with NATO. After the elections, the new *PSOE* government decided to delay the decision for a referendum on NATO membership. Domestically, NATO participation influenced the portioning of the limited Spanish defense spending. The Air Force and

¹⁴⁵ Heywood. p. 59 and 266.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 59.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 265-266.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid p. 265.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 263.

¹⁵⁰ Hoffman, R J, Senior Lecturer, Center for Civil-Military Relations, School of International Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School and Strategic Planner, Defense Operations Division, Office of the Defense Advisor to NATO and SECDEFREPEUR - 1989-1993. 27 April 2004. Monterey, CA.

Navy received a significantly higher budgetary apportionment because of their ability to integrate more readily into NATO operations and exercises.¹⁵¹

Reversing their position on NATO membership, the *PSOE* ultimately sought NATO integration based on strategic interests of joining the EC rather than concerns over whether NATO membership would serve the Spanish national interests. In other words, domestic and economic reality outweighed political concerns over NATO integration. Socialists maintained their fears of NATO's ability to solve diplomatic or military problems over Gibraltar and Melilla or Ceuta in Morocco. For Spanish diplomats, however, EC and NATO membership became a means to an end. The decision to accept NATO membership arose from a pragmatic desire for the internal economic benefits and political development that could progress by their integration into the European Community.¹⁵²

Spain's integration with Europe was necessary for economic modernization. The *PSOE* government faced significant budget restrictions during the transitional period and under the *PSOE*, the military budgets suffered. For example, Spanish leadership decided that they would participate fully in NATO's civil budget and military budget but did not participate in any infrastructure program until 1994. Similarly, Spain did not plan to participate in the NATO Security and Investment Program (NSIP) until 1999.¹⁵³

Because of this desire for EC integration, the *PSOE* shifted its policy stance more in line with the *UCD* concerning NATO integration. In the post election period, González reversed the *PSOE* position on NATO integration. To the new Spanish government, EC membership was the means for economic stability for the nation but when the EC leadership linked NATO membership with EC membership, the integration into the EC became more important to the Spanish political leadership than the desire to remain separate from NATO. Nonetheless, as per the election promise in 1982, Spain froze its participation with NATO and withdrew its delegates from NATO planning.¹⁵⁴

As the internal debate ensued, the question concerning a referendum became increasingly politicized. While the *UCD* had originally wanted NATO integration, the

¹⁵¹ Heywood. p. 263.

¹⁵² Mansito interview.

¹⁵³ United States General Accounting Office Letter Report. "NATO: History of Common Budget Cost Shares." 22 May 98. GAO/NSIAD-98-172.

¹⁵⁴ Agüero. p. 204.

PSOE's new position went against public sentiment in which only 14% of Spanish citizens' favored NATO integration.¹⁵⁵ The *PSOE* succeeded in delaying the vote while organizing a campaign in favor of joining NATO. "At no point in the campaign did the government defend its pro-NATO position in terms of defense and security policy; instead, emphasis was placed on the potential political and economic costs if Spain were to say no to NATO."¹⁵⁶

With the full support of the *PSOE*, the NATO referendum in Spain passed with a 52.5% vote in favor, 39.8% against and 7.7% with blank or void votes. Spain did maintain a measure of independence by establishing three criteria for further membership to NATO:

1. The participation of Spain in the Atlantic Alliance will not include its incorporation into the integrated military structure.
2. The prohibition of the installation, storing or introduction of nuclear arms on Spanish territory will be continued.
3. The progressive reduction of the military presence in Spain of the United States of America will proceed.¹⁵⁷

Spanish elites quickly matured politically into guarded integrationists with NATO by seeking to place limits on Spain's material support of NATO. Because of its desire to distance itself from the *UCD*'s agreements with NATO, the *PSOE*, however, initially sought to limit the fiscal and political support that Spain gave to the Alliance. One explanation for Spanish alignment away from the US and subsequently NATO, according to Michael González of the *Wall Street Journal Europe*, the *PSOE* ties with the socialist France influenced many of Spain's integration decisions. Spanish foreign policy became synchronized with the French in the early 1980s.¹⁵⁸ This led to an increase in the *PSOE*'s support of security and defense missions of uniquely European international organization such as the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Through this, the *PSOE* still maintained its relationship with the US but limited its support to NATO.

Domestically, conscription became a main source of contention with a high rate of absenteeism and desertion. The governments of the *PSOE* instituted civil service

¹⁵⁵ Heywood. P. 266.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 267.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Gonzalez, M. 13 Aug 03. *Wall Street Journal Europe*. "The Diplomatic Hurdle."

options as a substitute for military service but this action still did not contribute to a greater desire to serve the government. The military had become a reminder of the times of Franco and the Spanish people did not desire to remain associated with this legacy. Consequently, government began to find excuses for not sending deserting conscripts to jail and thus, the transformation of the military began through conscript accessions. As conscripts left the military, the political leadership was both unable and unwilling to replace them on a one-for-one basis. Illustrating this point are the statistics from 1980 that show 3.1% (356K) of Spaniards were a part of the military either civil or military personnel. This number decreased from 2.7% in 1985 to 2.1% in 1990. Through this trend, by 1995, the number of Spaniards serving in the military as civilians or armed forces had decreased to 1.7% (210K).¹⁵⁹

D. DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL ELITES

The Spanish transition to democracy was relatively peaceful but not without internal instability. “The Spanish transition is unique in terms of the military’s secondary role, the low level of violence, the degree of agreement among the transition’s protagonists, and a mechanism of transition based on a monarchy.”¹⁶⁰ However, “Spain is the European country that experienced the second largest volume of right radical and neofascist terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s, but right radical politics overall had been much weaker in Spain.”¹⁶¹ Left wing violence had a much more destabilizing effect on Spanish politics. The spike in terrorist activities from *Euskuadiko Ta Askatasuna (ETA)* from 1975-1981 caused the ultra conservative members within the military to question the direction of the government that gave progressively more autonomy to the regions. The perceived political weakness of the transitional government and the inability of the monarchy and government to handle internal disputes and terrorism partially explain the motivation behind the military coup on 23 February 1981.

Within the military remained a hard-line, conservative group that, while in the minority, vocalized dissent over the new policies with respect to the handling of internal

¹⁵⁹ NATO Press Release (2003) 146. 1 December 2003. Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense – Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (1980-2003).

¹⁶⁰ Baloyra, E.A. 1987. *Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone*. Boulder, Co. Westview Press. p. 15.

¹⁶¹ Payne (1995). p. 509.

problems of terrorism from Basque separatists and internal disturbances of strikes and demonstrations against the government. Because of this dissatisfaction with the direction and the pace of democratic transition, this core group of officers organized and planned a military coup in 1978 and eventually a coup attempt in 1981. The influence of the King, however, kept the majority of the officers from responding similarly.

This moment of crisis allowed the government to handle the situation with great effectiveness. “The king and his entourage, kept themselves busy on the phone, dispelling any impression that the military action had any royal support.”¹⁶² Additionally, the king

Appeared on the screen dressed in his uniform of captain general and said: I have issued the following order to all captain generals of military regions, naval zones and air regions: in the face of this situation created by the events in the Palace of Congress, and to avoid any possible confusion, I confirm that I have ordered civilian authorities and the Joint Chiefs, to take necessary measures to maintain the constitutional order within the existing laws...the Crown, symbol of the unity and permanence of the Fatherland, cannot in any way tolerate actions or attitudes of persons which the Constitution approved by the Spanish people determined in referendum.¹⁶³

With the challenge to the constitution handled, the military followed the leadership of the king and the military ceased to be a distraction to the political processes of the state. In fact, the striking point of the debate over the NATO referendum from 1982-1986 was the lack of military involvement and the lack of real influence that the military leadership gave towards this defining moment. The role of military during the initial NATO integration was determined by three primary factors: ideological differences between the individual Spanish forces, replacement of hard-line influences over the military forces and the legitimacy that the King Juan Carlos gave the democratic transition.

The lack of influence resulted from the divergent views of the individual forces. While the Navy and the Air Force had more exposure and practical experience in dealing with NATO operating procedures through joint exercises, the Army was deeply

¹⁶² Agüero, Felipe. 1995. *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore. The John Hopkins University Press. p. 164-165.

¹⁶³ Diario 16. *Historia de la Transición*. Chapter 44, p. 661 in Agüero p. 165.

concerned over the perceived “liberal ideological features of most NATO members.”¹⁶⁴ The Army did not like the perceived political orientation of NATO’s European left. The result was no unified voice for the direction for the Spanish armed forces.

Additionally, as the hard-liners lost influence after the coup attempt, the focus of military changed. From 1936 until 1975, the military had been used primarily to suppress the population. Because Spain had fought only one territorial war in the 20th Century in Morocco, much of the focus of the military was on internal stability. The regional organization of the regiments also contributed to this dominating military presence.¹⁶⁵ Upon integration into NATO, the defense forces had a new preoccupation with integration into the Western defensive structures and military exercises.¹⁶⁶

During the transition from the dictatorship, the military followed the King’s demands to maintain the democratic process. The King gave the political elites legitimacy because of their adherence to a popular consensus on first the issues of governmental reform and second, through constitutional development.¹⁶⁷

Besides military intervention into civil affairs, another key carryover from the Franco regime is in the strategic preference of Spanish elites is to develop strong alliances with its historic allies. For the *UCD*, the alliance with the US drove Spain’s initial integration into NATO. By understanding this motivation towards security related topics, Spain’s decisions to support the use of its military for security and defense operations become clearer. The *UCD* maintained the Franco allegiance with the US because of the United States’ strategic support since 1953. The US provided much needed infrastructural assistance and military modernization during the later portion of the Franco regime. Once the political situation matured, the US supported Spain’s NATO integration.

In contrast, the *PSOE* believes that the historical alliance and integration priority belongs with the European Community rather than the US because of the economic and political integration that took place during the 1980s. One explanation comes from Spain’s place in the European Community. The Spanish diplomats during the socialist

¹⁶⁴ Agüero, p. 205.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Mr. Fernando Mansito, Representative Adjunct – Political Security Committee to the European Union. 10 Dec 03. Brussels, BE. Spanish Embassy – Belgium.

¹⁶⁶ Heywood.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 70.

government of Felipe Gonzalez maintained a pro-French orientation.¹⁶⁸ According to Fernando Mansito, Representative Adjunct of Spain to the Political Security Committee to the European Union, Spain sought European integration because of economic and political necessity. “It is quite natural that we maintained a pro-French position during the early years of transition...we had no choice. Spain needed the economic benefits of integration into the EU.”¹⁶⁹ The need for economic integration drove a philosophical orientation away from NATO and towards the EC.

In light of this philosophical orientation towards Europe, the *PSOE* also sought to renegotiate the bilateral pact with the US on more equal footing. For the US, the agreement was more military than political. For the Spanish, the Pact became a focal point for political reevaluation. In stark contrast to the *UCD*’s negotiation style, Felipe Gonzalez set the tone for the *PSOE*’s discussions with the US by stating,

We should not be surprised that those defeated in the civil war and the democratic opposition in general should have viewed these treaties as American support for the dictatorship and a blow for the hopes of a rapid democratic restoration in Spain.¹⁷⁰

Responding to this rhetoric, the US Secretary of State George Shultz responded by indicating “that the United States was not used to staying where it was not wanted. If the Spaniards gave the impression that they did not want the United States to stay in Spain, well then the United States would go.”¹⁷¹ Mr. González did not want the US to leave Spain or for Spain to abandon the bilateral relationship. This “instinctive” rhetoric became a sign of the desire for the Spanish left to redefine the Spanish relationship with the US. Moreover, the 1986-1988 negotiations of the bases Pact demonstrated a fundamental shift in the Spanish-US relationship. The new agreement revolved around five key points: the US and Spain would agree on

a non-cosmetic but reasonable and flexible reduction of the US military in Spain...Adapt the contractual provisions to a new setting based upon mutual respect, sovereign equality of the two parties, and a fair burden-sharing of the defense effort, resolutely discarding any shadow of

¹⁶⁸ Gonzalez, M. 13 Aug 03. Wall Street Journal Europe.. “The Diplomatic Hurdle.”

¹⁶⁹ Mansito interview.

¹⁷⁰ González, F. 1987. “A New International Role for a Modernizing Spain” in Clark, Robert P. and Haltzel, Michael H. (eds.). *Spain in the 1980s. The Democratic Transition and a New International Role*. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co. in Viñas. 2003. p. 19.

¹⁷¹ Viñas. 2003. p. 19.

subordination to purely US interests...Reshape, to the greatest extent possible, the procedures and control systems of the authorizations to use the support facilities by the US forces...Separate the security and defense relationship from any other kind...Update the provisions relating to manpower and privileges, closing some of the gaps which had appeared in the implementation of the 1982 agreement.¹⁷²

Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Francisco Fernández Ordonez stated to Mr. Shultz, "What we want is a balanced relationship, not subordination. We want a relationship between allies, we want a relationship between equals, we do not want a military overextension."¹⁷³

Demonstrating Spain's new resolve in this, when the US government requested on several occasions to activate the bases and airspace for operations within the Mediterranean, in 1986, the Spanish government refused to allow the US to activate its bases or use Spanish airspace for its attacks on Libya. As a generalization, the *PSOE* would only allow airbases and airspace for use as a belligerent if the action were "undertaken in accordance with international law."¹⁷⁴

Signifying its allegiance towards Europe, Spain joined the Western European Union in November 1987.¹⁷⁵ Additionally, Spain signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the US on 1 December that brought about the *PSOE*'s goal of a bilateral relationship with the US on "equal footing."¹⁷⁶

Equally as important for the Atlantic Alliance, NATO's Committee on Defense Plans agreed on Spanish military contributions delineating Spain's general support for NATO operations.¹⁷⁷ One such commitment was the development of NATO's Rapid Reaction Force that later became the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in 1990-1991 under MC 317.¹⁷⁸ Demonstrating the solidarity between the French and Spanish positions, the two countries became opposed to the development of the missions under which NATO could use the ARRC. They became opposed not on the

¹⁷² Ibid. pp. 19-20.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 23.

¹⁷⁵ Heywood. p. 263.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 264

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Bono, G. 2003. *NATO's 'Peace-Enforcement' Tasks and 'Policy Communities': 1990-1999*. Burlington, VT. Ashgate Publishing Company. pp.25-26.

structural elements of the force but on the political nature of the missions that the force could assume.

It remained unclear whether the new forces could become engaged in 'out-of-area' operations. Some NATO countries were concerned that the IMS's (International Military Staff) proposals were going too far in restructuring NATO forces and in implying a future 'out-of-area' role for the Alliance. French and Spanish officials saw in the development of the ARRC an attempt by the British and the United States to use the Alliance for their own 'out-of-area' operations and thus reassert their dominance with the organisation.¹⁷⁹

From the US standpoint, a key point of the *PSOE*'s shift in foreign policy was the lessening of Spain's reliance on the US defense industry for weapon systems. Spain began curtailing its reliance on US weapon systems.

Spain's policy makers sought extensive involvement in European co-production agreements. Thus, the *PSOE* government committed itself to the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) project along with Britain, Italy and Germany, a co-production agreement with France and Germany for the Roland missile system, as well as further projects with France, Italy and Greece for the development of a naval anti-aircraft missile, an electronic jamming system and a nuclear powered submarine.¹⁸⁰

From 1993-1995, the *PSOE* government came under scrutiny for scandals involving activities against *ETA* and subsequently lost its absolute majority in the *Cortes*. This weakness allowed the center-right *Partido Popular (PP)* to win more seats within the Parliament. By late 1995, the *PSOE*-led coalition government became increasingly more favorable to full NATO integration. In November 1995, the Parliament voted for full integration into NATO's military structures.

The transformation of the *PSOE*'s foreign policy coincided with the crisis within NATO itself over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The shift in Spain's commitment to NATO came as a corresponding shift developed in the perception of the *PSOE*'s position towards NATO integration.

Highlighting this transformation, the liberal *El Pais* wrote in an editorial on July 15, 1996 saying,

Spain's non-military integration into NATO was somehow justified 10 years ago. What is now being contemplated is not the integration into a

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 26.

¹⁸⁰ Heywood. p. 268-269.

military structure designed against the Soviet enemy during the Cold War...The NATO of 1996 does not only exist to carry out side-defense tasks but missions like the present one in the former Yugoslavia in which countries like Sweden and Russia take part under the command of NATO...They are not defense missions but missions of preservation and establishment of peace outside the usual umbrella of the Alliance...It would be absurd and counterproductive for Spain's interests if France were to normalize its participation in NATO, and countries like Poland or the Czech Republic were to integrate fully into this organization, while Spain remained in an uncomfortable position that would reduce its influence in collective decisions and make Spain's participation in new missions more difficult.¹⁸¹

The change in world events necessitated Spain's full integration into NATO structures by 1996. During the transformation period, the Spanish right and the left moved closer to one another ideologically, but distinct strategic preferences remained. The right remained committed to US and NATO relationship while the left still preferred the OSCE and EU structures and integration. The strategic preferences of the Left and Right again determined the reactions that the Spanish elites would have towards participation in US-led coalitions, NATO-led operations and EU-led crisis management operations. The following chapter will examine how Spanish elites view out-of-territorial defense missions.

¹⁸¹ El Pais. 15 Jul 96. Editorial.

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IV. PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORT OF NON-TERRITORIAL DEFENSE MISSIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the Spanish political will and attitudes towards supporting and participating in non-territorial defense missions. The strategic motivation behind Spain's support of non-territorial operations is the combination of the desire to maintain regional influence, demonstrate international responsibility and support friendly governments or alliances. In critical periods during covering the Spanish democratic governments, Spanish administrations have supported non-territorial defense and security missions based on one or all of the above criteria. Conversely, when operations went against the strategic interests of the Spanish governments, Spanish forces did not participate in non-territorial defense or security missions. This chapter investigates how Spanish elites implement strategic initiatives into operational realities.

This analysis deals primarily with the period from October 1982 to May 2004 but decisions whether or not to participate in non-territorial defense operations for the Spanish military are not a recent phenomenon. During the World War II, the Franco regime allowed Spanish soldiers to support non-territorial defense missions. In the post WW II era, Franco again offered to send forces to help its allies. The initial portion of this chapter will examine the motivations and attitudes of the Franco regime to discern any strategic preferences that still apply to Spanish political elites. In addition, with the election of the *PSOE* in 1982, Spain's views on military employment shifted to regional defense with European integration and European defense structures. Through this transformation of the country into a democracy, Spain continued to maintain solid bilateral relations with the US. Because of Spain's commitment to international and coalition operations, Spain supported numerous UN, NATO and coalition operations in Iraq in 1991, in the Balkans and Africa in the 1990s, coalition operations in Afghanistan in 2002 and finally coalition operations in Iraq in 2004.

In defining Spanish elite's rational for non-territorial defense and security missions, Franco believed in reciprocating support for Spain's allies outside of Spain but not at the expense of Spanish national interests. After the Spanish Civil War, Spain's

foreign policy centered on the dynamic political relationship between Franco and Hitler and the economic and military necessity of receiving support from a foreign regime. Had Hitler maintained its support for Franco during the course of the Spanish Civil War, Franco quite possibly would have entered the war on the side of the Germans and Italians. Due to the perceived lack of strategic support from Hitler, Franco chose not to assist the Germans during the early portions of WW II. Later, when Franco did offer the 20,000 Falangists to the Germans, Franco was stemming a domestic power struggle within his government. Similarly, Franco attempted to use the offer of Spanish support to the US for Korea in 1950 to influence Presidents Truman and Eisenhower to gain political and economic support for Spain through a bilateral agreement with the US.

Critics of the 1953 Bases Pact express that Spain ceded a large measure of sovereignty in allowing a foreign military access to bases, airspace and ports without receiving sufficient political or military support in return.¹⁸² The alliance with the US allowed Franco to maintain his hold on Spain while bringing much needed infrastructure development to the country but the Pact did not help to solve other foreign policy problems of Spain. By contrast, Franco neither asked nor received any support for political problems stemming from the Spanish protectorate in Morocco. Neither the Pact with the US nor the military equipment that followed allowed Spain to maintain its claims on the Spanish protectorate in Morocco in April of 1956.¹⁸³ In fact, the US “never made any bones about its intentions not to become embroiled in Spanish disputes with Morocco.”¹⁸⁴ After 1963, Spain sought to renegotiate the bases pact with varying results but still maintained the relationship with the US because of the continued economic and military benefits to Spain. Key in this analysis is that the Franco government supported the allies that offered strategic assistance that helped develop the national interests of Spain. In this case, Franco himself defined the national interest of Spain.

While Spain did not participate in any security or defense missions outside of its territory from 1956-1986, the conditions of the Pact allowed the US to operate within the Mediterranean with relative ease. Once the unabated operations of the US became

¹⁸² Viñas (2003) pp. 9-10.

¹⁸³ Preston p. 644.

¹⁸⁴ Moroccan independence speaks more to the Franco-French antagonism that remained since 1939. Viñas. 2003. p. 4 and Preston p. 644.

controversial, a shift in the relationship between the US and Spain began to develop through the renegotiations of the Pact under first the *UCD* and later the *PSOE* after 1982.

B. 1982-1996: MAINTAINING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US WHILE INTEGRATING WITH EUROPE

After 1982, integration into the EC economic and political institutions took priority over NATO integration. Subsequently, the *PSOE* directed much of its energy towards the development of regional institutions such as the Western European Union (WEU), the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (later the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the European Corps (EUROCORPS).

Following a French model of international security orientation, the *PSOE* wanted to create more European options for security apart from a dependence on the US and NATO. On 23 October 1984, the *PSOE* published its strategic direction for foreign policy with respect to security operations. Below is the stated “Decalogue on Spain’s peace and security role” that followed a balanced security policy maintaining Spain’s bilateral relationship with the US but kept NATO integration limited.¹⁸⁵

1. Continued Spanish membership of NATO.
2. Non-incorporation into NATO’s military structure.
3. A change in the bilateral relations with the United States of America towards a gradual reduction in the presence of American forces and installations on Spanish soil.
4. The non-nuclearisation of Spain.
5. Possible signing of the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation.
6. The desirability of joining the Western European Union as the only European organization with defense capabilities.
7. Moves towards a definitive resolution of the Gibraltar issue.
8. The strengthening of Spain’s role within the European Disarmament Conference and application for membership of the Disarmament Committee of the United Nations.
9. The continued development of a network of bilateral agreements on defense cooperation with other west European nations.
10. Dialogue between political forces to achieve agreement on a joint strategic plan.¹⁸⁶

While Spain eventually committed to full NATO participation, Spanish elites would not set a specific timeline for the full integration.¹⁸⁷ Spain oriented its foreign

¹⁸⁵ Heywood. p. 278.

¹⁸⁶ “Felipe Gonzalez’s Decalogue on Spain’s peace and security role, presented to the Congress of Deputies, 23 October 1984.” Ibid.

policy towards its southern flank and this policy did not correspond directly to NATO's direction towards the East and the Soviet Union. The *PSOE*'s security orientation has consistently remained to the South in the Mediterranean and Northern Africa. Because of this orientation, "Spanish policy makers identified the CSCE, rather than NATO, as the most appropriate forum for debating security in Europe and the Mediterranean."¹⁸⁸

Seeking to "formalize" its foreign policy, Spain joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 5 November 1988 and became an "active observer in the WEU on 14 November 1988."¹⁸⁹ "Spanish membership was ratified by the *Cortes* in March 1990, but only after severe criticism by the WEU Assembly of Spain's ambiguous position in respect of European defense commitments."¹⁹⁰

1. The 1991 Gulf War

The first test of the Spanish foreign policy, however, came with the first Gulf War crisis from 1990-1991. As Spain sought to fulfill its international obligation through military support of the coalition, the Spanish population was against any out-of-area action for Spanish soldiers.¹⁹¹ After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the *PSOE* looked to coordinate its foreign policy with its European Community allies by supporting the WEU to support EC actions. During the initial stages of the coalition buildup to the conflict, the UN had not yet issued a resolution to legitimize coalition actions. Additionally, technical problems under international law remained unresolved for Spain to support US and coalition forces operating against Iraq in 1990-1991. Subsequently, during the first days of the crisis, support for coalition operations from the territory of Spain was not guaranteed by the *PSOE*.

In the end, "Spain did not hesitate in providing political, logistical and intelligence support. It was not a unilateral U.S. decision but an action undertaken in accordance with

¹⁸⁷ Hoffman, R J, Senior Lecturer, Center for Civil-Military Relations, School of International Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School. 27 April 2004. Monterey, CA. Professor Hoffman served as in the Defense Advisor in the Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Secretary of Defense, US Mission to NATO from 1989-1993.

¹⁸⁸ Heywood. p. 279.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid p. 263.

¹⁹⁰ Marquina, A. 1994. La evolución de la política de seguridad Española (1982-1992) in Calduch Cervera, (ed). p. 379-380 and Heywood. 294.2.fn.

¹⁹¹ Heywood. p. 282.

international law.”¹⁹² In this same vein, Spain established three criteria for supporting the gulf conflict.

First, in line with a decision adopted at a WEU ministerial meeting on 21 August 1990, a small-scale military contribution was made: three warships – a frigate and two corvettes – were sent to the gulf...Second, logistical support was offered to various countries, notably the USA, but also France, the UK and Turkey. Of particular importance was the use of the Spanish air bases: 35 percent of the total US air deployment operated via Spain, including over 300 missions by B-52 bombers flying out of Moron de la Frontera...Third, the Spanish government insisted that its forces in the Gulf would not enter direct combat, and also that it would not send ground troops.¹⁹³

“Nevertheless, rights were made available when the deployment began, in part owed to previous US security relations with these states, including security assistance programs, and the quick actions of State Department officials.”¹⁹⁴

In reality, the level of support ranged from the basing support at Spanish air bases in Moron, Zaragoza and Torrejón to the port support in Rota as a refuel and supply point for ships continuing into the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. As an example of support, the US was able to operate 22 B-52Gs supporting over 5000 sorties from Moron.¹⁹⁵ Because of the strategic airlift and aerial refueling originating from Moron, the US was also able to support a Contingency Intermediate Level Maintenance Center (CILMC) in Moron that provided “full avionics and intermediate-level maintenance capabilities.”¹⁹⁶

Examples of the technical issues impeding support from the Spaniards were the problems relating to international law. If Spain allowed the US or coalition aircraft to take off from Spain and bomb Iraq, Spain would become an active belligerent of the conflict. The *PSOE* did not want Spain to become an active belligerent in the war because the Spanish government had not yet informed its population that they were supporting the buildup of combat forces transiting to the Persian Gulf and Spain wanted to maintain

¹⁹² Vinas (2003). p. 20.

¹⁹³ Heywood. pp. 281-282.

¹⁹⁴ National Defense University. April 2002. Final Report to Congress – Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. Accessed on 29 April 2004 at <http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf>. p. 417.

¹⁹⁵ Lessor, I. 2000. *NATO Looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean*. Rand Corporation – Project AIR FORCE, Santa Monica, CA. p. 5.

¹⁹⁶ National Defense University. p. 513.

good relationships with the “Maghreb countries.”¹⁹⁷ Spanish elites set the requirement that the aircraft departing from Spanish airbases with the intent to bomb Iraq would take off from Spanish airbases with the weapons aboard the aircraft unarmed.¹⁹⁸ The US was able to resolve the issue by assuring the Spaniards that the weapons would depart from Spain unarmed and that the weapons would only be armed in international airspace.¹⁹⁹

Technical issues of support became important because the bulk of the support from Spain came from basing arrangements at airfields or ports. Spanish assistance was critical from Rota.²⁰⁰ Rota became a major hub for forces transiting from the US to the Persian Gulf. Rota also became a critical as a repair facility for US Naval shipping. The FSS *Antares* broke down during transit from the US. Instead of towing the ship back to the US, the ship was taken to Rota to have its boilers repaired. Because of the combined ability to airlift and sealift its remaining cargo and personnel to the Persian Gulf from Rota, the loss of combat capability remained minimal.

Spanish naval ships were also a vital member in the Maritime Interception Force (MIF) that conducted operations in the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz. While supporting this operation with a Spanish frigate, Corvettes, and supply ship, Spanish forces contributed to the security of maritime operations within the region.

Spanish elites remained uneasy about the domestic effects of the war from a practical standpoint. As Persian Gulf operations increased, the fuel requirements began to increase correspondingly. The Spanish fuel pipeline was unable to meet the demand.

Fuel consumption in Spain increased 300 percent from peacetime rates. This resulted in a demand on the Spanish-owned pipeline system, which provides resupply to US bases and the Spanish private sector that could not be met. USAFE officials negotiated with Spanish authorities and augmented fuel deliveries with tank trucks. At one time, as many as 60 tank trucks were delivering jet fuel, some of which came from refineries several hundred miles away. Additional mission requirements prompted a request by US officials for more fuel. Based on this request more Spanish pipeline time was made available for fuel deliveries at the expense of civil requirements.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁷ Spain was seeking to maintain good relations with Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco as well as the Alliance. Heywood. p. 282

¹⁹⁸ Hoffman interview.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ National Defense University p. 52

²⁰¹ Ibid. p. 520.

During the first Gulf War, strategic and political assistance from Spain was a critical part of the success in the operations. Because of Spain's commitment to share the burden of international security, Spain became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in October 1992.²⁰²

2. Bosnia

As operations in the Persian Gulf still dominated political attention, the Bosnian crisis developed into a humanitarian disaster. Initially, the EC looked to engage the problem as a European matter without the assistance of NATO. Spanish forces participated in the former Yugoslavia in October 1992 by sending 750 troops as part of the UN peacekeeping force.²⁰³ When the EC and UN became unable to effect change in the security problems in the Balkans, the *PSOE* began to seek a greater role for Spanish forces within a transformed NATO. This desire to have greater decision-making capability with respect to security missions outside of the territory of Spain became readily apparent with the decision to seek further NATO integration in 1995.

The *PSOE* continually needed to balance the ability to exert force outside of the territory of Spain with the negative public opinion that developed due to its operational commitments. Because of the initial negative public sentiment towards a NATO led operation in Bosnia, "Spain resisted NATO pressure to send an entire Brigade – up to 5000 men – to Bosnia in preparation for possible armed intervention of UN forces."²⁰⁴ Because of Spanish public opinion, the *PSOE* was not convinced that NATO should undertake peacekeeping missions.

In response to ally concerns over NATO's capability to execute peacekeeping operations and the ability to maintain the international legitimacy through military actions, the US and the EC began pushing for "interlocking of institutions" to perform peacekeeping activities.²⁰⁵ The EC sought a greater role for the WEU as well as developing a mission to assist the CSCE. As the US sought to support the Atlantic Alliance in the peacekeeping role, NATO and the WEU worked to help the "CSCE

²⁰² "This vote represented Spain's commitment for international security not only in Iraq and Kuwait but in Namibia as part of the Transition Assistance Group and Angola in overseeing the redeployment and later withdrawal of Cuban troops." Heywood. p. 282.

²⁰³ Ibid. p. 282.

²⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 283.

²⁰⁵ Bono. p. 51.

strengthen its crisis management mechanisms.”²⁰⁶ Spain aligned its foreign policies with those of Germany, France and Belgium in expressing that NATO should not seek to expand its mandate to peacekeeping and “out-of-area operations.”²⁰⁷

Additionally, by 15 May 1995, Spain along with France and Italy “announced the formation of the European (Rapid Deployment) Force (EUROFOR) and the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR).”²⁰⁸ The crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated that Spain could contribute to the Alliance and the Western European Union obligations during Operation SHARP GUARD and MARITIME GUARD from 15 Jun 93 to 19 Jun 96. In spite of a public sentiment against operations outside of the territory of Spain, Spanish participation in the Adriatic included two Frigates and a P-3B in support for maritime operations.

Because of the success of Spanish support within the framework of the Alliance, Spanish elites recognized that Spain could play a larger role in NATO and European defense and crisis management operations. The key obstacle for Spain, however, was the lack of a professional force and modern equipment in the military. The need for precision ordnance and compatible command and control equipment during Operation DELIBERATE FORCE helped compel Spain to begin defense modernization programs.

In spite of the technological obstacles, Spanish aviators were able to integrate into the aviation planning and operational structures at Aviano, Italy to participate in the combat operations with Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) missions, close air support (CAS) missions and other combat service support missions. Spain contributed to this NATO led operation with 8 EF-18A, 2 KC-130 and 1 CASA-12 but flew only 3.4% of all sorties flown during the combat operations from 29 Aug 95 to 14 Sep 95.²⁰⁹ After the Dayton Peace Accord, Spain continued its support for the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR).

Spain eventually sent a Mechanized Infantry Brigade Headquarters and two Infantry Battalions under the SFOR Multinational Division South East Command in the French and German sector. Additionally, Spain provided an Engineer Company and an

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Bono. pp. 51-52.

²⁰⁸ Ibid. 96-97.

²⁰⁹ NATO - Allied Forces Southern Europe – Fact Sheet. Summary of Operations – Operation DELIBERATE FORCE.

Engineer Battalion for support operations.²¹⁰ King Juan Carlos approved of Spain's increased commitment to international security via NATO in an address to the North Atlantic Council in April of 1996,

The implementation of the Peace Plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina through IFOR proves beyond any doubt the irreplaceable role that NATO is able to play, as it effectively combines the North American and European efforts. In this respect, I should once again like to pay my most sincere tribute from here to all those men and women who, first with UNPROFOR and later in the IFOR framework, have devoted their efforts, sometimes at the very high cost of their lives, to achieving a lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia.²¹¹

Following the Socialist's defeat in the 1996 general elections, the new Spanish President José Maria Aznar set the tone for the *Partido Popular (PP)* providing no major shift in Spain's support or orientation towards NATO or the EC security structures. In his first parliamentary meeting after the elections, President Aznar stated that his key priorities were Spain's strategic relationship with Europe and the economic state of the regions of Spain.²¹²

D. TRANSITION OF POWER AND THE SHIFT IN SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY – KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

While the first Aznar administration policies were clearly oriented on domestic concerns, Operations in Kosovo in 1999 provided the first opportunity for the new government to demonstrate its resolve in supporting additional international commitments. President Aznar committed four F/A-18As and a C-130 aircraft to the NATO-led operation against Slobadan Milosevic in the March 1999 operations.²¹³ Following the UN approved peace plan, the Aznar government committed 1300 ground personnel (4 Infantry Convoy, 1 Cavalry Squadron) to the Serbia & Montenegro Kosovo Force (KFOR).²¹⁴

²¹⁰ Bowman, S. R. 8 Jul 2003. Congressional Research Service – CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Bosnia: US Military Operations. Table 2.

²¹¹ King Juan Carlos address to the North Atlantic Council NATO HQ. Brussels, BE. 26 Apr 96. Accessed on 22 May 2004. <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s960426a.htm>

²¹² Gallego-Diaz, S. 2 February 2004. "The story of a satisfied prime minister." El Pais. p. 4.

²¹³ BBC News. "Spain." BBC MMIV. Accessed on 6 May 2004 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/on_kosovo_map/spain.htm

²¹⁴ BBC News. 18 March 2004. "NATO sends more troops to Kosovo." BBC MMIV. Accessed on 6 May 2004 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3522230.stm>

After the 2000 general elections, the *PP* won an absolute majority in the *Cortes* allowing Aznar's foreign policy to accept the "growing responsibilities both with NATO framework and regarding Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy."²¹⁵ Internally, Aznar abolished conscription, which removed a major obstacle for the deployment of Spanish troops abroad. Seemingly, however, political rivalries within the EU created the environment for the Spanish administration to favor support from the US administration over the EU. Member states of the EU were either unwilling or unable to assist Spain in solving diplomatic issues with Morocco and internal security problems of *ETA* that led Spain to seek US support.

Spanish elites defined their international obligations in terms of providing support to the countries that reciprocate with military, political and economic support. Mr. Mansito declared, "We are going to help the countries that help us. For example, the US helped us with the political problems with Morocco and our security problems with *ETA*. Because of that help, when the US had a problem, we reacted practically to that problem."²¹⁶

Demonstrating this point were the actions of the US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in interceding with the governments of Morocco and Spain in July 2002 over the Spanish Island of Perejil to solve a diplomatic dispute over Moroccan forces inhabiting the island. According to CNN, "Powell made about 30 phone calls to (Spanish Foreign Minister) Palacio and King Mohamed VI of Morocco as well as the foreign ministers of Morocco and Spain over the last two to three days."²¹⁷ As a result, the Moroccans left the island, and Morocco and Spain normalized their diplomatic relations.

Similarly, as Ambassador George L. Argyros, US Ambassador to Spain, explained,

Spain's own experience with *ETA* terrorism makes it a leading voice in the anti-terrorist coalition. The invigorated effort against terrorism since September 11 has helped the Spanish government in its efforts to rid Spain of *ETA* terror. When the US Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill recently announced the names of 21 *etarras* whose financial assets we would freeze, it sent a signal to the whole world that the U.S. would stand "side

²¹⁵ Gallego-Diaz p. 5.

²¹⁶ This support also included a pledge for \$56 million in war cost support. Mansito interview.

²¹⁷ CNN. 20 Jul 02 accessed on 10 May 2004 at <http://www.intellnet.org/news/2002/07/20/10380-1.html>

by side” with Spain in her fight, as President Bush pledged in Madrid in June 2001.²¹⁸

Notably, the US pledge for assistance with help with *ETA* came before the September 2001 attacks on the US and demonstrated a unified effort to combat internal and external terrorism prior to the swell of international support after 2001 against international terrorism.

Conversely, the inability or unwillingness of EU member states to help the *PP* with combating terrorism and intrastate problems prior to September 2001 set the tone for Spanish support for EU initiatives. Internal rivalries between individual EU member states still matter within the context of European Union security and defense policy. Illustrating this point, John Vinocur of the *International Herald Tribune*, in October 2003 wrote as follows:

To understand Europe after Iraq, said Ramón Gil-Casares, the Spanish secretary of state for foreign affairs, requires recognizing that the French-German relationship remains very important in the European Union's approach to economic affairs. At the same time, he said in an interview, "as far as foreign policy goes, the French-German axis is just not indispensable anymore. They cannot pretend it is, and they cannot speak for Europe."²¹⁹

According to Aznar, Spanish foreign policy had been too reliant on French foreign policy by adopting security policies similar to the French with respects to NATO and UN participation. Through the 1980s and 1990s, Aznar also believed that “Spain had squandered great strategic opportunities through its absence in all the major international conflicts.” September 11th, 2001 offered Spain an opportunity to demonstrate its strategic importance in the US-led operation in Afghanistan. Representative of the increased support for NATO, Spain supported Operation Enduring Freedom with 1300 military and medical personnel and currently supports NATO’s follow-on International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with 350 personnel.²²⁰ In the same manner that Spain became important with the first Gulf War, the bases and ports in Spanish territory gained the same strategic importance allowing the flow of military and logistical support for OEF

²¹⁸ US Ambassador to Spain – Ambassador George L. Argyros. “Spain and the United States Today.” A commentary published in ABC newspaper on Apr 10, 2002.

²¹⁹ Vinocur, J. 23 October 2003. “Spain touts a Europe with new power core: As host of Iraq donors meeting, it steps further away from France and Germany.” *International Herald Tribune*.

²²⁰ International Institute for Strategic Studies: *The Military Balance 2003/2004*. Vol 103. Issue 1.

and ISAF operations. In contrast to the first Gulf War, Spanish public support for the operations in Afghanistan remained favorable allowing for Spanish personnel to deploy in support of combat operations without much dissent.

The *PP* also provided reciprocal diplomatic support to the US for Operation Iraqi Freedom because of the combination of the political support that the US gave to Spain in dealing with Morocco and *ETA* and Aznar's strategic vision for Spain to have a greater influence in international affairs. The Aznar administration felt compelled to support the US administration because of the assistance from the US in the prosecution of *ETA* separatists in spite of the growing public opinion against the actions of the coalition against Iraq.

As for Spain's relations with the EU, Spanish elites realized during the negotiations with the UN in 2003 that France did not want a strong and independent Spain that would challenge the French over the formation of the European Union foreign policy.²²¹ As an example, only after September 11th, 2001 did the French government demonstrate the political will to assist Spain against the *ETA* activists living in Southern France. Additionally, the French were unwilling to assist Spain with its political problems with Morocco because of the French concerns over damaging its historic relations with Algeria and Morocco. In light of this lack of political support from member states of the EU, the Aznar administration shifted its support to a "US first policy option."²²² In response, the US gave Spain the continued and active assistance with both counter-terrorist operations against *ETA* and with the direct political intervention with Kingdom of Morocco, thereby insuring Spanish support for operations in Afghanistan, the North Arabian Ocean and Iraq.

During the negotiations in the UN, Spain offered the US "unwavering support in the United Nations."²²³ The *PP* supported the US viewpoint that UNSC Resolution 1441 was sufficient justification for actions in Iraq.²²⁴ While not participating in the initial combat operations in Iraq, Spain eventually deployed 1300 ground personnel to Iraq as part of the Multinational Division in South Central Iraq. Spain assumed a leadership role

²²¹ Mansito interview.

²²² Gallego-Diaz p. 5.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Mansito interview.

in this area, leading the Spanish-speaking members of the coalition according to its mandate to provide security for the reconstruction effort in Iraq.

E. MARCH 2004: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN SPAIN AND SHIFT IN FOREIGN POLICY

In keeping an campaign promise and demonstrating a clear shift in Spanish foreign policy after the March 2004 elections, the *PSOE* President Zapatero pledged that unless the occupation in Iraq is supported politically and militarily by a resolution by the “UN or any other multinational organization,” Spain would withdraw its forces from Iraq. Originally, the pledge of Zapatero was to allow for negotiation of a UN resolution that would offer a greater level of legitimacy to the coalition operations by 30 June 2004 and only after that date would a Spanish withdrawal begin from Iraq.

Two points led to Zapatero to hasten the withdrawal of the Spanish forces from Iraq. According to Spanish Minister of Defense, José Bono, the first point was a lack of consultation from the US command with the coalition forces in Iraq and the second was the belief that the US would not allow the UN to assume a sufficient role that would legitimize the operations in Iraq. According to General Jose Enrique de Ayala, second in command of the Spanish and Polish-led multinational division,

‘the point of inflection’ came on April 1, in Najaf, the spiritual capital, where 200 Spanish soldiers were deployed at the time...the US command declared the movement that was headed by radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr ‘as hostile’ and order ‘large-scale offensive operations,’ resulting in the closure of his newspaper and, on April 3, the arrest of his lieutenant Mustapha al-Yuqubi...‘The arrest was carried out without us being consulted,’ Ayala said. ‘If we would have been asked, we would have advised against it.’²²⁵

According to Ayala, the Spanish forces were unprepared for an offensive mandate and the actions of the US leadership put the Spanish soldiers at risk. The point of consultation resonated through the Multinational Division because few of the forces were equipped for offensive operations. A report drafted by Ayala for the Polish command

explained that his soldiers ‘are not an offensive force, our mandate was not to be one, our mission was to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction, and we lacked the resources to carry out an offensive strategy...The Spanish forces therefore became ‘witnesses to a conflict,

²²⁵ Vidal-Folch, X. 11 May 2004. “Report by military chiefs regarding Iraq situation precipitated troop withdrawal.” *El Pais*. p. 1.

mute witnesses of a situation we could not understand and did not agree with.’²²⁶

After a meeting between Mr. Bono, the Spanish Minister of Defense, and Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense, on 17 April 2004 that offered no change in the US position on UN authority in Iraq, Zapatero ordered his Minister of Defense to withdraw its forces from Iraq in the most expeditious manner. According to Bono, “I asked Rumsfeld in the Pentagon if he would accept a military operation under the command of the United Nations...He answered: ‘While I’m in this chair, a non-American commander will never command an American soldier.’”²²⁷ After additional consultation with the UK, Bono informed Zapatero that no UN resolution that would satisfy the *PSOE* would come from the UN and Zapatero ordered the early withdrawal of Spanish forces from Iraq. The Spanish Minister of Defense later announced that the Spanish forces in Iraq would be back to Spain by 27 May 2004.²²⁸

Spain’s decision to withdraw its forces led to a series of defections away from the US-led coalition that began to strain the other members of the coalition and the US. Spain’s withdrawal of its forces from the Multinational Division affected Honduras and the Dominican Republic who began withdrawing their forces from Iraq in May 2004.

In light of Spain’s withdrawal from Iraq, what is unclear is how Spain will demonstrate to the EU and NATO its commitment to international security. Spanish leadership will need to contend with the perception that Spain withdrew its forces due submission to terrorist attacks in Madrid. The *PSOE* is making clear public statements that Spain will remain a strong actor in the fight against terrorism but the new Spanish administration makes a clear distinction between the Global War on Terror and the operations in Iraq.²²⁹ Zapatero pledged the increase of Spanish force to Afghanistan while NATO has requested that Spain “assume control of Provincial Reconstruction

²²⁶ Ibid. p. 3.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Elkin, M. 28 April 2004. “Zapatero tells Congress all Spanish troops will have left Iraq by May 27.” *El Pais*. p. 1.

²²⁹ Gordon, P. 31 March 2004. “The Effects of the Madrid Terrorist Attacks on US European Cooperation in the War on Terrorism.” Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations – United States Senate, 108th Congress, Second Session. Washington, DC. Mr. Gordon is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution.

Team (RPT) in June 2004.”²³⁰ According to a *PSOE* spokesperson, NATO is asking Spain to assume a greater role in Afghanistan in light of its withdrawal from Iraq. Spain is considering contributing “up to 300 soldiers to the European Union’s High Command, which includes troops from France, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg.”²³¹ Additionally, Spain is in line to assume control of the NATO’s ISAF mission from Canada. While most of the forces sent to Afghanistan will most likely be used in security in Kabul, “the real task Spain confronts is taking command outside the capital.”²³² By removing its forces from Iraq and restating its commitment to ISAF, the *PSOE* has made the clear statement that unless the UN or some other international organization legitimizes international involvement, Spain will not participate in security missions outside the territory of Spain.

The following chapter looks at Spain’s integration into the European Security and Defense Policy. In general, understanding Spanish participation in EU and NATO defense and security force operations depends on considering how Spanish elites views its international obligations and how those obligations fit within its budgetary constraints and limitations. NATO and ESDP remain intrinsically linked and Spain sees no need to change this arrangement. Spain has a paradoxical relationship with the European Union. While Spanish elites see the need to increase integration with the EU, they also explain, “Spain cannot abandon its relationship with the US.”²³³ Spain has the opportunity to balance both policy objectives.

²³⁰ Gonzalez, M. 26 April 2004. “NATO asks Spain to assume control of security in Afghanistan province.” *El Pais* p. 1.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Mansito interview.

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V. ANALYSIS OF SPANISH INTEGRATION INTO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

A. INTRODUCTION

As Julian Lindley-French, Director of the European Security Policy Training Course at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy explains, “European defense is less about defense and more about politics.”²³⁴ This chapter develops how Spain views its role in the greater scheme of the European Union’s security and defense efforts and demonstrates how this role meshes within the scope of ESDP and NATO. This chapter also demonstrates that political rivalries matter within the scope of EU defense, this chapter also explains that Spanish strategic culture creates an environment that offers a bridge between the EU of 15 and the new EU of 25 member-states, and that Spain promotes strong relations between the expanded EU within both NATO and the US.

The need for further integration with the EU drives Spanish participation in ESDP. This participation is broken down into operational, industrial and economic implications that tie in the need to understand how this involvement plays into Spanish domestic politics. Additionally, this chapter develops Spanish integration into the EU’s crisis management capability, including its commitment to improve the EU’s defense capabilities and defense and industrial cooperation with a coordinated European industrial effort. In the end, however, this chapter will show that Spanish strategic culture leads Spain’s elites to make pragmatic choices with regard to security and defense based on national interests rather than parochial decisions that rely on purely EU integrationist or pro-US positions. Spain’s incorporation into ESDP depends on Spain’s defense industrial cooperation into European structures, modernization of its forces and further participation into EU-led crisis management and defense missions.

For full participation in NATO operations and EU crisis management operations, President Aznar began to transition Spanish forces into a professional military in 1996. The cost of this transformation is still a major factor inhibiting the modernization of the

²³⁴ Lindley-French, J. 3 Dec 03. European Defense-Lite: Why European Defense is Less About Defense and More About Politics. *Real Instituto Elcano – de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos*. p. 1

Spanish military. While Spain currently spends 61.7% of its defense funds on its military personnel, this is down from the 1995 levels of 66.5% for personnel.²³⁵ Significantly, the largest drop in Spanish defense spending comes in the area of research and development. Spain has decreased its R&D budget from \$252 million USD in 1997 to \$174 million USD in 2001.²³⁶ Spain also utilizes its Science and Technology Ministry to conduct research and development.

H.M. King Juan Carlos set the tone for civilian dealings with the military by calling for an increase in military spending following the tragedy of the mishap of the contracted YAK-42, carrying 62 Spanish personnel from Afghanistan in a post-deployment rotation. The King called for the government to increase the money that it spends for defense training and equipment. Ironically, Spain was already planning to purchase 27 A400 cargo/transport aircraft to reduce the dependency on contracted carriers with suspect maintenance practices.²³⁷

B. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION INTO EUROPEAN STRUCTURES

Moreover, Spain is deeply involved with both European and American defense industrial arrangements. Spain is not, however, as protectionist as some of the other more dominant members of the EU. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, European countries belong in four groupings with respect to

the percentage of equipment of US origin in service with the armed forces...group A (France and the United Kingdom): countries capable of producing the complete range of weapons systems, and importers of very little US equipment; group B (Germany): a country with the capacity to manufacture complete systems, and importer of very little US equipment; group C: countries with considerable (Italy, Spain and Sweden)... industrial capabilities, and purchasers of a medium amount of US equipment; group D: countries with little industrial capacity, and purchasers of a high percentage of US equipment (Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Turkey).²³⁸

²³⁵ NATO Press Release (2003) 146. 1 December 2003. Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense – Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (1980-2003).

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance INTERNET 2002/2003. Vol 102. Issue 1. p. 34.

²³⁸ Gordon Adams, Christophe Cornu and Andrew D. James, Burkhard Schmitt (ed.), *Between cooperation and competition: the transatlantic defence market* (Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper 44, January 2001). pp. 62-63.

Spain does play a significant role in the direction that the European defense industry is taking. Noteworthy mergers took place in the late 1990s within Europe that began to restructure the European defense industry. While the mergers do not represent a true “European” defense industry, they show a level of governmental acceptance of interdependence in areas that have previously been guarded under solely sovereign control. EU treaties specify the rules and levels of cooperation that EU member states may develop with defense industrial transactions. Specifically, Article 296 of the Treaty of Amsterdam and Nice applies “when the merger has both military and nonmilitary applications.” In such cases, “the Commission reviews the nonmilitary aspects of the deal, while national merger laws are applied to the military ones.”²³⁹

Despite this cooperation, the Spanish government must still approve “any foreign investment in a Spanish defense company.”²⁴⁰ Additionally, the use of a “golden share” exists in the Spanish defense industries owned by foreign companies.²⁴¹ Moreover, Spanish companies must “obtain approval, either for a geographical area, for exploring external markets, for obtaining permission to export weapons systems at...each phase of the export process.”²⁴² Because of the nature and sensitivity of this process, the highest

²³⁹ Treaty of Nice, Article 296 1. The provisions of this treaty shall not preclude the application of the following rules:

- (a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security.
- (b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes. See the EU Treaty of Amsterdam http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/treaties_other.html and the Treaty of Nice http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/search_treaties.html and Center for Strategic International Studies Commission on Transatlantic Security and Industrial Cooperation in the Twenty-first Century, Simon Serfaty, et al. The future of the transatlantic defense community: final report of the CSIS Commission on Transatlantic Security and Industrial Cooperation in the Twenty-first Century. p. 47.

²⁴⁰ Adams, et al. p. 68.

²⁴¹ Golden Shares are utilized in companies and corporations that have strategic implications for the state such as “infrastructure projects, utilities, natural monopolies, mining operations, defense contractors and the space industry.” They enable the government to retain the “final say” in business decision. They also forbid a single company in taking “more than 15% stake in the company.” BBC News. UK Edition. 13 May 2003. “BAA ‘golden share’ ruled illegal.” Accessed 19 April 2004 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3022809.stm>

²⁴² Adams. p. 69.

level of government must sometimes approve “specific lists of products” that are under negotiation.²⁴³

In light of the growing acceptance of defense consolidation, three primary organizations have emerged that dominate the defense industry in Europe: British Aerospace and GE-Marconi combined to create BAE Systems, while Aerospatiale-Matra, Dasa, and CASA of France, Germany and Spain, respectively, formed the European Aeronautic, Defense and Space Company (EADS). The third major defense company in Europe is Thales from France.²⁴⁴ The motivation behind the Spanish government’s action is to create an environment that allows its defense corporations to make the most appropriate deals that they can with respect to the direction of the Spanish Ministry of Defense that are within the restrictions of Spanish laws.

For example, cooperation between the major companies is seen with arrangements such as the relationship between Lockheed Martin of the US and EADS representing Spain, France and Germany with a licensing agreement for a Patriot missile upgrade.²⁴⁵ Also, the Meteor program involves a host of participants, to include BAE Systems, Saab and Boeing.²⁴⁶ This defense cooperation demonstrates that the integration of American and European businesses is seeking further opportunities for cooperation.

US firms invest significantly in Spain allowing Spanish defense privatization programs to set the tone for defense modernization and armament projects. For example, on July 25, 2001, the Spanish government negotiated the sale of an armored vehicle manufacturer, *Santa Bárbara Blindados*, and a munitions manufacturer, *Nacional Santa Bárbara de Industrias Militares*, to General Dynamics. General Dynamics combined the two companies as *Santa Barbara Sistemas*, a firm that employs approximately 2000 employees and will generate over \$2 billion USD in back-log orders alone.²⁴⁷

Until a consolidated European Agency for Armaments, Research and Capabilities stands up to unite and harmonize EU armament programs, Spain will pursue several initiatives with European and US partners for armament procurement. Spain joined the

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Adams, et al. p. 27.

²⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 127.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Madigan, S. “General Dynamics Acquires Two Spanish Arms Makers.” Washington Business Journal. 23 Jul 2001.

Western European Armaments Group and its subsidiary organization – the Western European Armaments Organization. The Letter of Intent and the Framework Agreement concern measures that facilitate the restructuring and cooperating of the European defense industry and the European research grouping arrangement (ERG) No. 1 concern cooperative defense research and technology projects that began on 18 December 2001.

The legal basis for this European interaction is from two primary agreements. The Letter of Intent (LoI) of 6 July 1998 between France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK defines the “framework for the measures to be taken by these states to accompany restructuring in the defense industry.”²⁴⁸ The Preamble to the Framework Agreement between France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland concerning measures to facilitate the restructuring and operation of the European defense industry, signed at Farnborough, the United Kingdom, on 27 July 2000, set forth the protocol to

create the political and legal framework necessary to facilitate industrial restructuring in order to promote a more competitive and robust European defense technological and industrial base in the global defense market and thus to contribute to the construction of a common European security and defense policy.²⁴⁹

In response to the European initiatives, the US Department of Defense (DOD), under the direction of the Clinton administration, established two countering initiatives designed to promote increased cooperation between European defense industrial companies and the US. The US DOD created a bilateral Declaration of Principles (DOPs) with individual European nation-states, including Spain, and sought “the harmonization of defense trade rules, practices, and procedures.”²⁵⁰ Additionally, the US developed the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) that sought to restructure the US export control system.²⁵¹

²⁴⁸ Adams, et al. p. 86.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Serfaty, S. (ed). The future of the transatlantic defense community: final report of the CSIS Commission on Transatlantic Security and Industrial Cooperation in the Twenty-first Century. Center for Strategic International Studies Commission on Transatlantic Security and Industrial Cooperation in the Twenty-first Century p. 43.

²⁵¹ Schmitt, B. April 2003. European Armaments Cooperation – Core Documents. Institute for Security Studies. Chaillot Paper No 59. p. 62.

In contrast to the development of the LoI and DOP, France and Germany created the Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR) on 12 November 1996 with the inclusion of Italy and the UK.

(The) working principles are designed to achieve true industrial and technological complementarity among the four countries; common procurement principles (competition governed by common rules yet to be worked out); renunciation of the detailed calculation of industrial *juste retour* programme by programme, in favour of an overall balance across several programmes and over several years; integrated transnational teams (both governmental and industrial).²⁵²

Spain placed its order for the A400M through the OCCAR and has applied for membership within the OCCAR but has not been successful in this bid because of its request for more equal voting representation on the Board of Supervisors of the OCCAR.²⁵³ The OCCAR currently oversees major industrial projects like the A400M, Tiger, Roland, Boxer, Cobra and the Future Surface to Air Missile. OCCAR representatives maintain that Spain must become part of another major program besides the A400M to garner larger representation on the Board.²⁵⁴

C. SPANISH FORCE MODERNIZATION

According to a paper presented to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Spain intends to purchase 24 Tiger helicopter for utilization on its new amphibious assault ship.

Spain signed a contract in February (2003) to build a new multipurpose amphibious assault ship that is expected to be delivered in 2008. The ship will be able to carry four large helicopters or six smaller helicopters. It will also be able to carry short take-off and landing aircraft, and heavy equipment such as tanks or armoured personnel carriers. It will also be able to hold up to 1,355 personnel and doubles the capacity of Spain's two existing amphibious assault ships. This is part of a €4.6 billion package recently agreed to by the Spanish government. In addition to the multipurpose ship, Spain also plans to build four new submarines capable of firing cruise missiles, and 24 Tiger attack helicopters. Most of the funding for this package is expected to come from the sale of surplus Ministry of Defence property.²⁵⁵

²⁵² Serfaty. pp. 84-85.

²⁵³ Schmitt, B. August 2003. The European Union and Armaments – Getting the Bigger Bang for the Euro. Paris. Chaillot Papers No. 63. p. 27.

²⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 25

²⁵⁵ Miranda Calpha, J. 147 DSCTC 03 E – Reform Of NATO Command Structure and the NATO Response Force. NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

Additionally, on 12 June 2003 Spain's Defense Minister, Federico Trillo signed an agreement with 10 other defense ministers from NATO "to build capabilities on strategic sealift" that will continue to expand Spain's defense modernization.

Spain increased its defense budget from 7.3 bn (Euros) in 2002 to 7.5 bn (Euros) in 2003, although spending will fall in real terms. Procurement funding was increased by 1.4% to 1.63 bn (Euros), 55% of which will go towards upgrades, 32% towards maintenance and 12% towards R&D. 272m (Euros) and 96.5m (Euros) respectively (have) been earmarked for further development of Eurofighter and acquiring 27 A400M aircraft.²⁵⁶

In another policy shift after the Socialist's victory in March 2004, the Bono announced the decision to suspend the new agreements reached by Trillo.²⁵⁷ It is still uncertain what, if any, change will take place with this defense cooperation.

The ability to project forces is driving Spanish procurement requirements for numbers and types of systems. "Spain cannot produce the complete range of equipments but is capable of producing nationally the major armaments with which its forces are mainly equipped."²⁵⁸ While Spain is not reinforcing a "Fortress Europe" system, Spain obtains approximately 32% of its current total military equipment from the US.²⁵⁹ "In the naval and land equipment sectors, the 'Fortress Europe' issue is more a question of confrontation between the different European industries than a struggle against American Industry."²⁶⁰

Spain demonstrates an even balance between defense initiatives with domestic suppliers, collective groups and the US in terms of weapons and defense system purchases. Of its 27 defense modernization initiatives, seven are from domestic producers, including all naval vessels. Five initiatives are through collective organizations such as the OCCAR to include the Helios I spy satellites for utilization at a

²⁵⁶ *The Military Balance INTERNET 2002/2003*. International Institute for Strategic Studies: Vol 103. Issue 1. p. 246. This is the only reference that cites Spain as agreeing to purchase the Tiger. Accessed on 10 May 2004 at http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/hdb/Volume_103/Issue_01/pdf/20030242.pdf

²⁵⁷ *El Pais*.

²⁵⁸ Adams. p. 64. See also General Alberto Zignani, 'L'Italie et l'Europe de l'Armement', *l'Armement*, no. 61, mars 1998, pp. 114-20, as well as individual country sections (Belgium, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) of *Calepin International* (Paris: DGA/DCI, Ministère de la Défense), édition 07/2000; and *The Military Balance 1999-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1999), pp. 30 ff.

²⁵⁹ Adams. et al. p. 62.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 75.

Satellite Center at Torrejón, Spain.²⁶¹ Spain also has contracts for five defense systems initiatives with US firms for 30 F/A-18A, 100 AIM-120B, 12 C-130J, 12 Javelin and 6 SH-60B.²⁶²

While Spain has developed a significant independent ship building capability, many concurrent NATO agreements have ESDP implications:

After having endorsed the recommendations of the High Level Group on Strategic Sealift, the Defence Ministers of nine nations (Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom), signed a Multinational Implementation Arrangement (MIA) on 1 December 2003, and agreed to acquire a capability package consisting of multinational and assured access charter. The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) was appointed to assist in developing contracts for the necessary assured access.²⁶³

One of the key drawbacks to having an independent capability is the lessening of interoperability between navies and air forces in the EU. To combat this, Spain, France, Germany and Italy are participating in a US common program called the Multifunction Information Distribution System (MIDS) that is designed to make their navies and air forces more interoperable with one another.²⁶⁴

The European Air Group also attempts to improve cooperation and integration of European Union aviation assets.

The fundamental objective of the EAG is to improve cooperation and interoperability between the participating air forces and to develop innovative solutions for optimizing their capabilities over a wide range of air power issues such as logistics, air operations, communications and the protection of air bases...Specifically, the group is tasked to find new approaches to help alleviate the shortfall in European airlift capability.²⁶⁵

Spanish elites realize that their country does not need to maintain a 360-degree defensive posture. Although Spain is attempting to improve its expeditionary capabilities, it has limited ability to deploy its forces for concurrent NATO and EU crisis

²⁶¹ Heisbourg, F. September 2000. European Defense: Making it Work. Paris. Institute for Security Studies – Western European Union. Chaillot Paper 42. p. 68.

²⁶² *The Military Balance INTERNET 2002/2003*. pp. 261-262.

²⁶³ NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency. 19 February 2004. Accessed on 11 May 2004 at http://www.namsa.nato.int/news/news_e.htm

²⁶⁴ Adams, et al. p. 102.

²⁶⁵ Vlachos-Dengler, Katia. November 2002. Getting There: Building Strategic Mobility into ESDP. Paris. European Union Institute For Security Studies. Occasional Papers No. 38. p. 40.

management operations. Much of this limitation comes from the lack of strategic lift and power projection capability to deploy and support its forces once deployed.

Spain currently has approximately 4366 military and civilian personnel abroad (approximately 3-4% of its total forces) supporting UN, NATO, EU or coalition operations.²⁶⁶ Table 1 lists the forces currently deployed in support of various operations. This table highlights the level of capabilities and scope of the various operations and includes the forces scheduled to depart Iraq in May 2004.

D. PARTICIPATION INTO EU-LED CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND DEFENSE MISSIONS

Additionally, Spain participates in the development of the ESDP's Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) capability.²⁶⁷ While this capability is still limited, it represents how the EU can contribute to UN, OSCE and EU operations in a civil as well as military capacity. In the early 1990s, the Spanish political left, in particular, saw cooperation with the OSCE as preferable in certain situations over NATO. In light of this, the *PSOE* believes that the alternative security arrangements with organizations such as the OSCE can "promote a new security system based neither on nuclear deterrence, nor on mutual distrust."²⁶⁸

While structural limitations exist for funding future EU operations, the process remains the result of developing the individual political wills of member states to take action in a given crisis, regardless of where the funding comes from. Through the common fund of the EU, Spain contributes to the funding of EU-led operations such as Bosnia's EUPM and Operation Concordia and its mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The key difference between EU military operations and the operations that have a predominately-civil impact is in the funding of those operations. Civil operations come from the common budget of the EU whereas funding for military operations "remain under strict national control."²⁶⁹

²⁶⁶ See *The Military Balance INTERNET 2002/2003*. Accessed on 10 May 2004 at <http://libproxy.nps.navy.mil/login?url=http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/contents/> pp 55-58.

²⁶⁷ Ehrhart, Hans-George. October 2002. *What Model for CFSP?* Paris. Institute for Security Studies. Chaillot Paper No. 55.

²⁶⁸ Heywood. p. 279.

²⁶⁹ Missiroli, A. June 2003. *Euros for ESDP: Financing EU Operations*. Paris – European Union Institute for Strategic Studies. Occasional Paper No. 45. p. 26.

Spain's contributions to common budgets are seen as an indicator of its commitment to the EU. Spain ranks fifth in total contributions to the EU, behind Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, respectively. Consequently, Spain shares its proportional funding towards ESDP. In actual terms, Spain contributes 7.46% of its GDP towards the EU.²⁷⁰

As noted, Spain places a high emphasis on security to its south. "North Africa is the source of a migratory flow northward, with the Mediterranean as a barrier of sorts. Spain, Italy and to a lesser degree France, are relatively exposed."²⁷¹ The direction of the EU respect to the development of its ESDP will come from the political will of its member states. With the Barcelona Process and the Mediterranean Dialogue of NATO, Spain continually pushes the European Union and NATO towards improved relations with Mediterranean nations. The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke of this

Mediterranean dimension of Spanish foreign policy in the following terms: "The peace, stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean Basin and all the countries in it is one of the priorities of Spanish foreign policy (...) The enrichment of the Barcelona Process, the preparation of an overall joint EU strategy on the Mediterranean and the contribution to good progress of the Middle East peace process take on full importance in this framework and will continue to be one of the government's priorities."²⁷²

While Spain maintains the ability to support both NATO and EU operations, the Spanish role within ESDP is complicated. Spain seeks an independent voice within the context of ESDP while maintaining strong relations with the US and NATO. According to Spanish elites, EU actions cannot jeopardize Spain's "historic" relationship with the US.²⁷³ This view also represents a common perception among newer members of the EU and NATO. NATO and ESDP remain intrinsically linked and Spain sees no need in a change in this arrangement. The newer members of NATO and the EU will support ESDP as long as NATO as an organization is not jeopardized. Spain's motivation behind supporting NATO is that the Spanish people do not want to see a European defense structure without the guarantee of US support.

²⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 19.

²⁷¹ Heisbourg, F. September 2000. European Defense: Making it Work. Paris. Institute for Security Studies – Western European Union. Chaillot Paper No. 42.

²⁷² De Francisco, C. (ed) 2002. *Spain Today*. Madrid. (Spanish) Government Spokesman's Office. Translated by Dwight Porter. p. 146.

²⁷³ Mansito interview.

Spain offers an example of how to maintain strong bilateral relations with the US while supporting NATO-led operations and contributing to the further integration of the EU. Spain demonstrates the characteristics that the EU needs to promote a strong EU infrastructure and military posture to conduct autonomous actions. As demonstrated in this chapter, Spain displays good interoperability while increasing its capabilities for the future. The key for Spanish integration into further cooperation with ESDP will depend on developing a coherent policy with the rest of the European Union member states as well as developing the political will to act in actions that affect the periphery of the Union. Internal rivalries will detract from the development of EU policy goals as well as the inability of the EU to solve structural problems with funding operations.

EU-Led Under United Nations Mandate

DROC (MONUC): 3 including 2 observers

FYROM: (Op Concordia): 16 personnel

Bosnia (EU Police Mission) 24 Police, 2 Civil Administrators

NATO-Led Under UN Mandate

Afghanistan (ISAF): 350 personnel (est)

Bosnia (SFOR II): 1400 personnel; 2 Inf Convoy, 1 Cav Sqdr,

Italy (Op Deliberate Forge): 4x F/A-18A, 1xKC-130

Serbia & Montenegro (KFOR): 1300 personnel; 4 Inf Convoy, 1 Cav Sqdr

Coalition Action Under UN Mandate

Afghanistan (Op Enduring Freedom): 5xC-130; 8x CN-235, 1xP-3.

-Two frigates and one logistic ship deployed to the CENTCOM AOR to support continued operations in OEF.

Iraq (Op Iraqi Freedom): 1300 (est) personnel (forces due to retrograde back to Spain as of 27 May 2004)

-Deployed one medical facility (Level II+, 14 beds) embarked on an LPD and one deployable Field Hospital (Level II+, 40 beds) to North Arabian Gulf and Umm Qasr, respectively. To date, they have treated in excess of 1,800 non-enemy prisoner of war personnel and incorporated Lithuanian medical personnel in Spanish facility at Umm Qasr. A Marine platoon and engineer unit are supporting humanitarian reconstruction in the Umm Qasr and Basrah areas.²⁷⁴

UN Led

Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE): 5 including 3 observers

TABLE 1. Spanish Forces deployed abroad (After USCENTCOM, Missiroli and *The Military Balance Internet 2003/2004*)²⁷⁵

²⁷⁴ United States Central Command Website. ACCESSED ON 24 MAY 2004 http://www.centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/Coalition_pages/spain.htm

²⁷⁵ Missiroli, A. June 2003. *Euros for ESDP: Financing EU Operations*. Paris – European Union Institute for Strategic Studies. Occasional Paper No. 45 and *The Military Balance INTERNET 2003/2004* p. 57.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter's begins with a summary of the strategic preferences of the political and military elites of Spain that define Spain's strategic culture. The three case studies of how Spain integrated into NATO, supported out-of-territory defense missions and integrated into the EU's European Security and Defense Policy offer important considerations for the future of the relationship between the US and Spain, Spain and NATO, and Spain and the European Union. The three case studies represent a cognitive mapping of the decision-making processes of Spanish elites. Through this thesis, strategists can better understand how Spanish elites view the function and efficacy of military force in international affairs.

The method of analysis of this thesis was to deconstruct periods of relative crisis to gain a greater understanding of the motivation and thought processes behind the decisions of Spain's political elites revealing their strategic preferences. By determining the actions of the Spanish elites during a response to crisis periods, this thesis has sought to bring out certain aspects of the strategic preferences of Spanish elites that are lost in the discussions about how Spain developed its foreign policies in light of the Madrid bombings in 2004.

The theme behind this thesis is that the decision-making processes of the Spanish elites do not depict the impetus behind how the Spanish government reacted during the events of March 2004 and that the actions of the *PSOE* are consistent with the historical strategic preferences of that political entity. Neither the bombings on 11 March 2004 nor the outcome of the elections of 14 March 2004 represents a significant restructuring of the political setting in Spain. To gain a more complete portrait of Spanish strategic culture, this thesis focused on the two major political movements in Spain as well as developing the role of the military through the political maturation process.

The two major political entities, the *PSOE* and the *PP*, have definitive strategic preferences with noteworthy commonalities. The second portion of this chapter draws conclusions on how the *PSOE* may build its foreign policy based on their strategic preferences as developed since 1975. Similarities exist in how the *PSOE* and *PP* deal

with certain issues within foreign policy but this conclusion will bring out that Spain represents a microcosm of the differing political and ideological orientations within Europe that may offer further impetus for European integration.

The final portion of this chapter builds on the understanding of the strategic importance of Spain to the US's Global War on Terror. As this thesis has demonstrated, without the Spanish bases and political support from various Spanish administrations, military actions during the Cold War and other military operations in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf would not have been possible. This basing support remains the focal point for the US security relationship between Spain and the US. Support for counter-terrorism operations continues to dominate the Spanish political processes. This thesis will offer additional policy recommendation directed to the US Executive Branch to highlight strategic concerns relating to the transatlantic relationship between the US and Spain and the US and the EU. This policy recommendation will focus on measures the US Executive Branch might consider to regain the initiative on the Global War on Terror.

B. STRATEGIC PREFERENCES

The formation of the collective identities of the primary groups within Spanish politics demonstrated how Spanish elites became socialized in particular ideologies. The process by which elites became socialized is important to understand because of the evolution by which the Spanish elites formed their strategic preferences. As a review, "elites socialized in different strategic cultures will make different choices when placed in similar situations."²⁷⁶ Three key points that affected this formation of collective identities of the Spanish leaders were the traditional confrontations between liberals and conservatives, the weak development of nationalism built around the autonomous communities and the movement of both the liberals and conservatives to more centrist and moderate positions.

Due to the late development of industrialization in Spain, much of the formation of the modern liberal policy coincided with the realization that Spain was no longer a global power after the loss of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898. Historically, the key differences between the parties are that the conservative groups preferred more centralized power while maintaining the values of "classical liberalism" and "traditional

²⁷⁶ Johnston, p. 35

Catholicism.” Conversely, in the original political mandate of the *PSOE*, the Left preferred a greater degree of regional autonomy with greater social freedoms and the absence of the Catholic Church in government.

Another key to the formation of the strategic preferences was that nationalism remained weak in Spain. Unlike much of Europe, the conservative governments in Spain were able to suppress the nationalistic movements of the left but still allowed for a measure of regional autonomy. As a result, the desire to protect regional autonomy remained a strong inspiration for policies of the various governments in the last century. The effects of this regionalism reflect in domestic policies of the *PP* and *PSOE* that differ with respect to the degree and scope of the amount of autonomy for the regions. While the *PP* prefers the current constitutional provisions that maintain a strong central state, the *PSOE* is seeking a constitutional amendment for a restructuring of the upper house of the *Cortes* that provides greater checks and balances with regards to decisions of the Parliament.²⁷⁷

A primary socialization issue that influenced the development of Spain’s strategic preferences was the ideological movements of both the Left and the Right towards the center and more moderate positions in the late 1970s. The hard-line right and the extremely radical left ideologies were detrimental to the development of democracy in Spain during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in 1923, the 2nd Republic of 1933-1936 and the Franco dictatorship from 1939-1975. This ideological movement of the Spanish elites corresponded with a popular rejection of nationalistic symbols from the authoritarian past under the Franco regime. This pacifistic and anti-nationalistic movement still resonates in public opinion towards international affairs.

Strategic preferences become apparent after understanding how socialization issues affected the ideological development of Spanish elites. A key strategic preference that begins with Franco in 1936 and continues through the current political discussions is that the Spanish right exchanged reciprocal support to countries that provided military, political or economic support to Spain. By reciprocating this support, Spain’s demonstrated its international obligation through its commitment to non-territorial security operations and burden sharing arrangements through international organizations.

²⁷⁷ Elkin, M. 12 May 2004. “Zapatero proposes constitutional reform for Senate.” *El País*. p. 1.

Because of Spain's strategic location and historical alliances, Spain is also able to provide influence through dialogue with friendly governments or alliances that maintain Spain's regional influence in both Latin America and Northern Africa.

The *PSOE* also adheres to the principles of reciprocal support but to a point. The *PSOE*, as well as many other EU members, requires additional measures of international legitimacy to justify the deployment of military personnel outside of the territory of Spain. While both the *PSOE* and *PP* have demonstrated the political will to support deployment of forces for out-of-area operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Gulf Wars, the *PSOE* is more sensitive to public opinion than the *PP*. This is the underlying consideration behind the *PSOE* limiting their involvement in international security operations. Operations that gain international legitimacy from either NATO or the UN are much more favorable than modern coalitions. Without this measure of international justification, the *PSOE* will probably not actively support belligerent combat operations.

Still, key ideological divisions exist. It is an oversimplification that the *PP* seeks an independent voice through foreign policy alignment with the US and that the *PSOE* seeks to become more "European" in its strategic outlook. Both *PP* and *PSOE* realize that Spain is in a unique position to continue a strong bilateral relationship with the US while the *PSOE* leadership shies away from the development of a Paris-Berlin-Madrid axis in the EU. Spanish elites desire to be in the

vanguard of the European Union...But we also want the United Kingdom in that vanguard. Europe cannot be built without the presence of such an important country as the United Kingdom. And Europe cannot be understood except in terms of all of its 25 members – each has its national sensibilities, its interests, its priorities, and its ambitions.²⁷⁸

Since 1981, the *PSOE* has also adopted pro-European nature. The origin of this European orientation is the result of the return of the exiles to Spain. One Spanish viewpoint is that after the reinstitution of democracy in Spain, the exiles that had left Spain during the Franco years returned from France, Germany and England who upon return to Spain professed that "the real Spanish patriotism consisted in wanting to live

²⁷⁸ Almunia, J., Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, European Union, interview in Yarnoz, C. 18 May 2004. *El País*. pp. 4-5. Spanish President Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero nominated Mr. Almunia as the EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs as he was a long time *PSOE* economic minister.

like the Europeans *par excellence* – who, for many of us were the French.”²⁷⁹ Under French tutelage, the PSOE developed a comprehensive and independent foreign policy that sought independence from a “unilateral or preferential alliance.”²⁸⁰ With that, the evolution of the *PSOE* seeks a foreign policy of equal stature to the French as well as to the United States. As seen when confronted with unilateral behavior from the US, the *PSOE* responded with the aggressive withdrawal from the coalition in Iraq.

C. INTERPRETATION OF SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY

As with most modern democracies, the dominant political group is able to establish the national priorities that demonstrate strategic preferences of that particular group. In general, Spanish foreign policy has fundamental philosophical differences that do exist stemming from the traditional confrontation between the liberal and conservative parties.

The period from 1996-2004 under the *PP* administration under President José Maria Aznar demonstrated a new spectrum of political leadership in international security affairs. The *PSOE* may learn to build on that leadership role maintaining its importance not only in European Union affairs but also in world affairs. Under the *PP*, Spain was attempting to find an independent voice within the context of European Union and NATO security structures. This attitude resonated through the whole of the *PP*’s foreign policies. The *PSOE* is still highly critical of the *PP*’s foreign policy citing the over reliance on the US for support in international affairs and the level of support that the *PP* gave to the US administration particularly in the 2003-2004 operations in Iraq.

While the Spanish right represented the prototypic “Atlanticist” attitudes that prevails in much of Southern and Eastern Europe, the *PSOE* believes that “Europe first” should be the primary foreign policy orientation. The conservative critique of the *PSOE* foreign policy is that it will follow the policy orientations of the French and Germans with respect to European integration. As both the *PP* and *PSOE* agree, the bilateral relationship with US is an important aspect in developing Spain’s foreign policy. Ideological and political commonalities exist between the political and military elites of Spain that are representative of a larger portion of the European Union.

²⁷⁹ Julia, S. 17 May 2004. “Roots of our ‘Europeanism.’” *El País*. Professor Julia is a historian and professor of the Social History and History of Political Thought Department at the UNED (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia). p. 2.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

Based on the strategic preferences of the *PSOE*, the *PSOE* will seek greater integration into the European Union – not from a need to move away from the US but through a desire to contribute to a unified European Union with 25 members. With European Union integration policy, the *PSOE* may benefit the most from the *PP*'s insistence on greater parity for Spain's position through negotiations of the Treaty for a Constitution of the European Union. While moderating the *PP*'s views, the *PSOE* defines its motivations to seek greater unification in Europe as a need “to work together, harmonize our interests, look for common political projects, and on that basis, create a European project that is both attractive and useful.”²⁸¹

In either case, the foreign policies of the *PSOE* offer a compelling vision of possible security initiatives due to Spain's strategic relationship with North African and Latin American countries. The ability to preempt security problems in regions that the US is attempting to penetrate will counter the environment favorable for terrorist recruitment and activity. Counter-terrorism is still a sensitive subject with the *PSOE* and allows an area that is available for cooperation between the US and Spain and the EU and Spain.

The under developed security institutions of the EU will be strengthened by Spain's policy shift towards the EU. The development of the EU's Counter-terrorism group on 30 March 2004 is a key development on how events in Spain provided an impetus for further EU integration. While counterterrorism is a central theme for both sides of the Atlantic, Javier Solana, with Spanish support, directed the development of an intergovernmental counterterrorism organization that could contribute to operations of the US Department of Homeland Security. Currently the EU is developing the equivalent organizational structure to coordinate and monitor anti-terrorism operations within the EU.

A significant difference between the *PSOE* and the *PP* will be with Spain's commitment to international organizations. In this respect, NATO and the UN will take lead roles in determining how Spain will develop security responses to global security challenges. Both *PSOE* and *PP* realize that Spain should not maintain a 360-degree

²⁸¹ Almunia p. 4.

defense posture but budget constraints will necessitate further integration into defense structures that maintain multilateral legitimacy.

As indicated in the reported discussions between Secretary Rumsfeld and Mr. Bono, the *PSOE* may not appreciate the nuanced political relationship between the US and UN in terms of UN commanders leading US forces and Spain may be unwilling to participate in operations that are not led by a UN or NATO commander. In that respect, Spanish participation in NATO and organizational support will prove less problematic for both the *PSOE* and the US and could be the avenue pursued for security integration between the US and Spain beyond the bilateral agreements already established.

Through defense industrial cooperation, the *PSOE* may also make the mistake of acting on no clear mandate to cut the level of economic integration with existing defense contracts that were providing benefits to Spanish industrial development. Prior to the bombings, the majority of Spaniards were heavily in favor of the *PP* government because of the *PP*'s economic programs in spite of the implications of maintaining Spanish forces in Iraq. The *PSOE* may overstep its mandate for change in this respect. Cutting defense spending that affects the Spanish industry will be a major obstacle to defense industrial development of Spain.

D. US FOREIGN POLICY RECOMMENDATION

Because of the US reliance on the continued military and basing support from Spain, this assessment of the current state of defense burden sharing between the US and Spain and the Spanish commitment to the Global War on Terror deals primarily with maintaining the security relationship with Spain through Atlantic Alliance structures. The most probable effect of the turnover of power in Spain will be an increase in Spanish participation in international organizations. The *PSOE* views NATO and the EU's Common and Foreign Security Policy concerning the EU's crisis management structures as having a certain standard of legitimacy not found in their current bilateral relationship with the US.

As for possible areas that the US could seek additional engagement with the policy orientations of the *PSOE* would be towards their security concerns in Africa and Latin America. Spain can provide significant leadership in dealing with governments in those regions. Through Mediterranean Dialogue, the US can lead NATO's expansion

into the Mediterranean and Northern Africa, which represents the direction that Spain envisions as its strategic priority. For example, the close cooperation between the Kingdoms of Morocco and Spain during the investigation of the March bombings indicates that dialogue is possible that will contribute to greater resolution to handling immigration problems and poverty issues that affect the Spanish and Moroccan relationship.

Aspects of US foreign policy remain contentious to the *PSOE*. The Pentagon's policy of awarding defense contracts to the companies that participated in operations in Iraq also had a political effect against the US policy. After Spain supported the operations in Iraq, the Pentagon shut Spain out of contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq. In addition, a key point for the continued Spanish support in Iraq was that the *PSOE* expressed to the US that Spain desired further negotiations via the UN to keep Spanish forces in Iraq. Through the actions of the US forces in Iraq, the *PSOE* did not perceive that the US was treating Spain as a political and diplomatic equal in developing a strategy for operations in Iraq.

The *PSOE* makes a clear distinction between the operations in Iraq with NATO operations in Afghanistan. This mirrors the European Union position that the Operation Iraqi Freedom has little to do with the US-led Global War on Terror. In light of the break with Spanish leadership, the coalition in Iraq is weaker politically without Spanish support. Spanish influence is most readily seen through the defections in the smaller countries out of the coalition. To reengage Spain and other members of the EU that are not currently part of the coalition, the US would need to alter its National Security Strategy away from the perceived autarkic policy of preemptive military actions against threats.

The unilateral behavior and non-consultation by the US administration led to the early defection of Spain and others from the coalition in Iraq. Until a shift in US policy occurs, it is likely that no other EU members will assist in reconstruction or humanitarian operations in Iraq. The Spanish position towards consultation represents the views of similar sized nation-states in Southern Europe and Latin American that have like beliefs towards the US-led Global War on Terror. Several countries in Europe, Northern Africa

and Latin America have already followed Spain's lead in developing an independent strategy towards the Global War on Terror.

Based on the lessons from this strategic culture analysis of Spain that identified the strategic preferences of the *PSOE*, a linkage develops for Spain to rely more heavily on international institutions for their engagement in security operations. Reliance on international organizations is a common viewpoint of the majority of EU members. Through this commonality with other prominent members of the EU, Spain provides a unifying element to the EU because of its political and economic potential within the EU. Therefore, Spanish political support will contribute to greater solidarity to the political will of the EU decision makers.

The lack of international support for the Global War on Terror may create a potentially severe drain on US resources causing the US to expend too many human and fiscal resources to carry the burden for the majority of the security in Iraq. The further loss of international involvement in Iraq will have a strategic impact of the National Guard, active and reserve Marines, sailors and soldiers that prosecute operations in Iraq, actions in Afghanistan and defense of the US homeland simultaneously.

Because of the lack of international agreement over the conduct and legitimacy of the US-led coalition in Iraq, US national interests in Europe and Southwest Asia are at risk if the US administration does not adapt a coherent foreign policy concerning the operations in Iraq. As a starting point, pursuing support from the UN will be unproductive without the full political and economic weight of the European Union. The UN will not be able to affect a change in the security in Iraq unless the EU as a whole engages in the operations in Iraq. For the EU to fully engage with the combined economic, political, diplomatic and military capabilities in Iraq, however, the US would need a fundamental shift in its National Security Strategy away from the perception of unilateralism and non-consultation. The further inclusion of the EU in Iraq will probably not occur until the US foreign policy adjusts to a position more favorable to European Union involvement. The result of the lack of international and EU support is that the US will continue to share the unequal burden of security in Iraq after the turnover of sovereignty to the Iraqi interim government on 30 June 2004.

Beyond Iraq and in the fight against global terrorism, the US foreign policy will eventually need to further develop the US diplomatic mission to the EU with its increasingly federal structures in order to integrate the US Department of Homeland Security with the diplomatic, defense, economic and counterterrorism agendas of the US mission to the EU to further the interests of the US and NATO.

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